holding that Grant did not apply since the ineffectiveness claims were raised in a post-sentence motion and fully developed at a hearing in the trial court, the trial court addressed the issue in its opinion, and appellate review therefore was not hampered
How later courts described this case
- holding that Grant did not apply since the ineffectiveness claims were raised in a post-sentence motion and fully developed at a hearing in the trial court, the trial court addressed the issue in its opinion, and appellate review therefore was not hampered
- holding that direct appellate review of ineffective assistance of counsel is permitted where the issues were raised in the trial court, a hearing was held at which trial counsel testified, and the trial court passed on those claims
- stating “that a trial judge’s competency determination should be afforded ‘great deference’ because the judge has the opportunity to personally observe the defendant’s behavior.” (emphasis added)
- emphasizing that it is “not the obligation of this Court to pore over the lengthy record [to] identify specific instances in the record that may support [an] appellant's generic, unsubstantiated claim”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disapproved by Commonwealth v. Stollar, 624 Pa. 107 (2014)
826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003) (creating an exception for raising ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal when the relevant ineffectiveness claims have been properly raised and preserved in the trial court, the trial court holds a hearing on those claims, and the trial court addresses the merits of the claims in a subsequent opinion) has been disapproved by Stollar, supra
Disapproved — as noted by a later court
Such option was not available, however, at the time of its decision to proceed under Bomar — a practice which has been disapproved.
medium confidenceQuestioned by Commonwealth v. Barnett, 2011 Pa. Super. 147 (2011)
Three of the six participating justices in Rega, however, expressed reservations as to the continued viability of Bomar.
Questioned by Commonwealth v. Turner, 622 Pa. 318 (2013)
She further argues that the continued viability of the Bomar exception to this general rule has been called into question by this Court and was not a reliable option to obtain review of her ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal; therefore, she cannot be faulted for failing to avail herself of Bomar.
Questioned by Commonwealth v. Allen, 2013 Pa. Super. 279 (2013)
Moreover, the continued validity of the Bomar procedure is currently pending before our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Holmes, 606 Pa. 209, 996 A.2d 479 (2010).
Limited by Commonwealth v. Holmes, 621 Pa. 595 (2013)
By way of summary, we hold that Grant’s general rule of deferral to PCRA review remains the pertinent law on the appropriate timing for review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; we disapprove of expansions of the exception to that rule recognized in Bomar; and we limit Bomar, a case litigated in the trial court before Grant was decided and at a time when new counsel entering a case upon post-verdict moti…
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Thomas, 618 Pa. 70 (2012)
Even if we were to assume that Bo-mar’s holding can be properly characterized as an exception to Grant’s general rule, Bomar is distinguishable both legally and factually from the instant case.7 The direct appeal in Bomar was pending in 2002 when Grant was decided.
The opinion
*479 JUSTICE NIGRO
CONCURRING.
I join the majority opinion with the limited exception of its discussion regarding the “bring-down” order used to transfer Appellant from the prison to the CID offices for questioning regarding the Willard murder case.
Although I fully agree with the majority that the “bring-down” order was undoubtedly erroneous, I cannot agree with the majority’s seemingly dismissive approach to the misuse of that erroneous order. To that end, the majority notes that Appellant does not cite to any evidence of record establishing that the error in the order was anything other than a mere “mistake” or “oversight.” While that may be true, it still remains that the order only authorized the transfer of Appellant for a hearing and not for what it was ultimately used for-the questioning of Appellant regarding the Willard case. In my view, the Commonwealth should simply not be allowed to use a court order for one purpose when that order explicitly authorizes its use only for a different purpose. See Commonwealth v. Karash, 513 Pa. 6 , 518 A.2d 537, 542 (1986) (“The misuse of a court order is an affront to the court issuing that order.”) Nonetheless, I ultimately agree with the majority that Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim because the transfer did not, under the circumstances here, implicate Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights.