Opinion

Taylor v. Hill

  • 464 A.2d 938
  • 1983 Me. LEXIS 788
Court
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Filed
Aug 26, 1983
Status
Published
Author
Roberts
On the bench
McKusick, Godfrey, Nichols, Roberts, Violette, Wathen
Cited by
17 cases
Authority
More cited than 8.9%

referencing the American College of Surgeons, "a national organization which sets standards of care for its member surgeons, ... [and] plays an important role in setting and maintaining national standards of care for surgical specialist.”

How later courts described this case

  • referencing the American College of Surgeons, "a national organization which sets standards of care for its member surgeons, ... [and] plays an important role in setting and maintaining national standards of care for surgical specialist.”
  • rejecting locality rule; declining to consider “what role, if any, geography will play with regard to the standard of care applicable to non-specialists”
  • a member of one specialty may testify to the standard of care applicable to another specialty provided he is familiar with the standard of care and qualified to testify about it

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

ROBERTS, Justice,

dissenting in part.

I join in Part I of the Court’s opinion. I cannot concur, however, in Part II. In my view the record in this case exposes the unfairness of the rule established in Givertz v. Maine Medical Center, 459 A.2d 548 (Me.1983). By application of the Givertz rule Russell Taylor’s suit is dismissed without any hint of prejudice to the defendant as a result of lack of notice. See Givertz, 459 A.2d at 556 (Roberts, J., dissenting).

The procedural history of this case demonstrates how the Givertz rule undermines the legitimate function of the notice requirement as outlined in Dougherty v. Oliviero, 427 A.2d 487 (Me.1981). When this action was commenced the defendant did not seek relief pursuant to Dougherty . Rather, he simply alleged enigmatically that plaintiffs “failed to perform all conditions precedent required by law.... ” The defendant lay in wait behind that vague allegation until after the two-year statute of limitations had expired. Then, for the first time, the defendant made specific reference to Russell Taylor’s failure to give notice pursuant to 24 M.R.S.A. § 2903. Clever defense counsel has turned section 2903 into “a trap for the unwary.” See Erickson v. State, 444 A.2d 345, 351 (Me.1982) (Roberts, J., dissenting).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.