Opinion

Commonwealth v. Rosenzweig

  • 514 Pa. 111
  • 522 A.2d 1088
  • 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 465
  • 1987 Pa. LEXIS 669
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Mar 19, 1987
Status
Published
Author
Zappala
On the bench
Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson, Zappala, Papadakos
Cited by
10 cases
Authority
More cited than 8.9%

employee deposited checks that were payable to his employer into his own account rather than the employer’s account

How later courts described this case

  • employee deposited checks that were payable to his employer into his own account rather than the employer’s account
  • monetary loss is not element of theft by unlawful taking or disposition

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Morrissey, 540 Pa. 1 (1995)

    Nevertheless, Rosenzweig is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.
    Supreme Court of PennsylvaniaJan 18, 1995Read it

The opinion

ZAPPALA, Justice,

dissenting.

I find it necessary to write separately and express my great displeasure at the obstinacy of the Philadelphia prosecutor’s office which once again prompts the majority to conduct an exercise in mental and legal gyrations and gymnastics in order to rescue a criminal information from invalidity. Instead of merely amending the informations handed down, the prosecutor chose to blithely pursue a conviction based on artlessly drafted, and thereby erroneous informations.

I again feel constrained to remind my brethren that it is not within our mandate to correct legal errors committed by the prosecutor, but only to review matters of alleged error and apply the law and duly promulgated rules to achieve a legally correct result. See, Commonwealth v. Gordon, 511 Pa. 481 , 515 A.2d 558 (1986) (Zappala, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Brown, 506 Pa. 169 , 484 A.2d 738 (1984) (Zappala, J., dissenting). In stretching the boundaries and interpretation of these cases and rules in order to achieve the “correct” result, we do nothing to promote consistency in our jurisprudence nor confidence in our legal system. The convoluted path traversed by the majority in reviewing the quashed informations does nothing to promote either goal.

*124 Because of the unusual facts and circumstances of the instant case and because the decision of the Superior Court was rendered in an unreported memorandum opinion of no precedential value, there appears no compelling reason for this Court to have granted review in the first instance. Sadly, however, the Opinion of this Court, including its speculative “dabbling" in the law of commercial transactions, has the potential for affecting cases far beyond its parameters.

The Superior Court, in affirming the trial court’s decision to quash the informations correctly held that such a decision should be reversed only where there has been a clear abuse of discretion, citing its decision in Commonwealth v. Niemetz, 282 Pa.Super. 431, 439 , 422 A.2d 1369, 1373 (1980). After review of the record and consideration of the majority’s Opinion, I cannot find a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and would affirm the Superior Court’s Order on that basis. I therefore dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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