the purpose of the forfeiture statute is to provide a cure where it can reasonably be done; who can be cured and refuses soon dries sympathy
How later courts described this case
- the purpose of the forfeiture statute is to provide a cure where it can reasonably be done; who can be cured and refuses soon dries sympathy
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Mills v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 138 Pa. Commw. 691 (1991)
Claimant argues that Muse is inapplicable here because Claimant suffers multiple disabilities unrelated to his compensable injury and is unemployable because of his age, education, and previous work experience.
Distinguished by Joyce Western Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 518 Pa. 191 (1988)
The claimant herein asserts that the Muse analysis is inapplicable in the instant case for several reasons.
The opinion
LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s interpretation and analysis of section 306(f) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 77 P.S. *9 § 531(4), that the focus of the statute is on the reasonableness of the services offered and not on the reasonableness of the employee’s refusal to accept the treatment, although the latter might be a factor in determining whether the services offered were reasonable.
However, I do not agree with the majority that the “record developed before the referee consisted solely of uncontested evidence supporting a conclusion that the surgery was reasonable,” and that “on the record, the referee’s conclusion was unsupported by the evidence.” Majority op. at 6-7. It is true that the claimant did not introduce medical evidence as to the reasonableness of the proposed surgical procedure to counter the medical evidence offered by the employer. What the record also contained, though, was that claimant’s uncontroverted actual medical history, which included the fact that the previous surgical procedure to correct his work-related hernia, performed at the employer’s request, was unsuccessful and caused further damage, pain and suffering. Presumably, the risk associated with that first surgery was no more than the risk associated in any surgical procedure (the record does not indicate otherwise), and yet that first surgical procedure failed with serious consequences for the patient.
As the majority states, “what is reasonable [medical services] has meaning in the context of each case.” Majority op. at 8. The context of this case included the actual failure of the prior surgical procedure performed to correct the claimant’s work-related injury. Accordingly, I disagree with the majority’s finding that “the record was barren of any evidence to support a finding of unreasonableness” of the surgical procedure. To the contrary, I believe the claimant’s actual medical history provided substantial, competent evidence for the referee’s determination.
I dissent.
HUTCHINSON and PAPADAKOS, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.