Opinion

Commonwealth v. Williams

  • 532 Pa. 265
  • 615 A.2d 716
  • 1992 Pa. LEXIS 473
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Oct 9, 1992
Status
Published
Author
Nix
On the bench
Nix, Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala, Papadakos, Cappy, Larsen
Cited by
99 cases

holding that a prosecutor’s statement that “there is no doubt I think from this evidence that indeed his intention was to shoot at or kill Erica,” was proper because he related his suggested conclusion back to the evidence

How later courts described this case

  • holding that a prosecutor’s statement that “there is no doubt I think from this evidence that indeed his intention was to shoot at or kill Erica,” was proper because he related his suggested conclusion back to the evidence
  • holding no new trial was warranted based on allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments, where prosecutor’s statement was based on evidence as to how jury should resolve conflicting testimony; arguments on how jury should resolve conflicting testimony are not considered expressions of personal opinion if based or relate back to evidence presented at trial; rejecting “cumulative impact” of various claims of prosecutorial misconduct as makeweight or bootstrapping, where no number of failed claims can collectively attain merit if they could not do so individually
  • finding trial court’s instruction to jury not to draw any adverse inference from prosecutor’s comment upon defendant’s post-arrest silence during closing argument sufficient to cure any potential prejudice therefrom
  • presenting a fabricated defense through suborned perjury admissible to show consciousness of guilt

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

NIX, C.J.,

files a concurring and dissenting opinion.

APPENDIX A

(1) Whether the testimony of Commonwealth witnesses, Kevin Harrell and Catherine Rivers was self-contradictory, unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus, insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

(2) Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request that the trial court enter a Directed Verdict of not guilty based upon the insufficiency of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth.

(3) Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to demur to the charge of murder in the first degree based upon the insufficiency of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth.

(4) Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a cautionary instruction that Catherine Rivers’ police statement should not be considered as substantive evidence and that the prosecutor was permitted to read from the statement only for the purpose of rebutting an inference of fabrication.

(5) Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request an acquittal instruction, which would have defined the elements of the crime charged, the applicable burden of proof, and the jury’s ability to acquit the defendant if the Commonwealth failed to prove any of the required elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

(6) Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to reiterate his objection to the trial court’s flight instruction before the jury retired in order to preserve the issue of flight for appeal.

(7) Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to reiterate his objection to the trial court’s denial of his request for a “missing witness” [Erica Riggins] instruction before the jury retired in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.

*291 (8) Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the portion of the trial court's instructions to the jury, wherein the trial court stated that “Catherine Rivers does certainly present testimony that supports the Commonwealth’s version of this matter,” which impermissibly vouched for the veracity of the Commonwealth’s case and ignored contradictory evidence presented by the defense.

(9) Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the trial court’s refusal to instruct on its “leniency power” available through voluntary manslaughter.

(10) Whether trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object on the basis of irrelevant rebuttal to the testimony of Philadelphia Police Detective Kenneth Curcio concerning his inability to locate a witness who had previously stated that one of the defense witnesses had originally stated that Williams had killed Gordon Russell.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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