“there may ... be difficulties in determining a credible value for the alienable/realizable good will; whether these difficulties are surmountable may vary with the peculiar facts of particular cases.”
How later courts described this case
- “there may ... be difficulties in determining a credible value for the alienable/realizable good will; whether these difficulties are surmountable may vary with the peculiar facts of particular cases.”
- “If it can be shown that, despite organization as a sole proprietorship, good will value may be actually realized through sale of the business or practice, then good will value must be included. However, to the extent good will is actually personal and inalienable, and thus cannot be actually realized through sale, [good will should not be included]”
- "The trial court’s decision that appellant had or would receive through equitable distribution sufficient assets to pay her own counsel fee was supported in the record. We find no abuse of discretion.”
- in.determining value of business for distribution, court considered only the value of the business assets
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*493 OLSZEWSKI, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I respectfully concur in nearly all aspects of the majority’s disposition of appellant’s claims. I must, however, dissent from that portion of the opinion which remands this case for a determination of the value of the goodwill of appellee’s dental practice. On this point, I find nothing present in the facts herein which would warrant distinguishing this case from our decisions in DeMasi v. DeMasi, 366 Pa.Super. 19 , 530 A.2d 871 (1987), and Beasley v. Beasley, 359 Pa.Super. 20 , 518 A.2d 545 (1986). To the contrary, as in DeMasi and Beasley , I would hold that the value of the goodwill in this case is dependent in large part on the unique talents of Dr. Fexa himself and, as such, could not be transferred upon a sale of his interest. Accordingly, I would affirm that portion of the trial court’s equitable distribution order which excluded goodwill from the valuation of appellee’s dental practice.