where the appellant argued on appeal that his sentence was disproportional to that received by his co-actor, but the record before us was devoid of any information concerning the co-actor other than the appellant’s bald assertion that this person received a time-served and probationary sentence, appellant’s assertion involved matters dehors the record, and we declined to consider the issue
How later courts described this case
- where the appellant argued on appeal that his sentence was disproportional to that received by his co-actor, but the record before us was devoid of any information concerning the co-actor other than the appellant’s bald assertion that this person received a time-served and probationary sentence, appellant’s assertion involved matters dehors the record, and we declined to consider the issue
- "time intervening between a defendant's filing of pre-trial motions and the trial court's disposing of such motions is also time which is properly excluded from the computation of the 180-day period under Rule 1100 due to the unavailability of the defendant"
- “[Cjompliance with the requirements of [Rule 2119(f) ] wastes valuable judicial resources by adding an additional tier to our analysis of a defendant’s attack on the discretionary aspects of his sentence .... ”
- “[C]ompliance with the requirements of [Rule 2119(f)] wastes valuable judicial resources by adding an additional tier to our analysis of a defendant’s attack on the discretionary aspects of his sentence….”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
POPOVICH, Judge,
concurring.
I write separately to note my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that “42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781 does not clearly, palpably, and plainly violate our State Constitution.” (Opinion at 440) Rather, I am convinced that § 9781 violates the absolute right of a defendant to appeal his sentence pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article 5, § 9 which provides:
There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record from a court not of record; and there shall also be a right of appeal from a court of record or from an administrative agency to a court of record or to an appellate court, the selection of such court to be as provided by law; and there shall be such other rights of appeal as may be provided by law.
My opinion leads me to agree with my distinguished colleague, Judge Joseph Del Sole, who, in his concurring *131 opinion in Commonwealth v. Barnes, 388 Pa.Super. 327, 333 , 565 A.2d 777, 781 (1989), also concluded, “... 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b) violates Article 5, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” I adopt his analysis of the constitutional issue as set forth in Barnes, 565 A.2d at 780-781 . See also Commonwealth v. Laskaris, 385 Pa.Super. 339 , 561 A.2d 16 (1989) (concurring opinion by Del Sole, J.).
I am further convinced that compliance with the requirements of Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508 , 522 A.2d 17 (1987) wastes valuable judicial resources by adding an additional tier to our analysis of a defendant’s attack on the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 1
We should simply address appellant’s sentencing issues. I have reviewed appellant’s attack on the discretionary aspects of his sentence and have found no abuse of discretion by the sentencing court. The sentencing judge complied with the requirements of the sentencing code, the sentence is well within the statutory maximum and minimums, the court had an extensive presentence investigation at its disposal, and the court stated adequate reasons for the sentence imposed on the record. See Commonwealth v. Devers, 519 Pa. 88 , 546 A.2d 12 (1988). Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
. Note, almost eight full pages of the majority’s slip opinion is devoted to the determination of whether appellant presented any substantial questions concerning the propriety of his sentence and then addressing on the merits the two substantial questions raised.