stating that the question of voluntariness “is not whether statements made by the interrogators were the cause of defendant’s confession, but rather whether those statements were so manipulative or coercive that they deprived [defendant] of his ability to make an unconstrained, autonomous decision to confess” (quotation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating that the question of voluntariness “is not whether statements made by the interrogators were the cause of defendant’s confession, but rather whether those statements were so manipulative or coercive that they deprived [defendant] of his ability to make an unconstrained, autonomous decision to confess” (quotation omitted)
- concluding that officers’ suggestions that defendant’s limited role in murder or absence of premeditation might reduce offense or sentence 8 was a prediction, which is rarely viewed as sufficiently coercive to render confession involuntary, and noting that statement did not appear to have had much effect on defendant
- recognizing that police may use some psychological tactics in eliciting a statement from a suspect, and stating that “[e]ven if such tactics play a part in the suspect’s decision to confess, the confession is voluntary so long as the decision is a product of the suspect’s own balancing of competing considerations”
- explaining that question is not whether statements made by interrogators were cause of defendant’s confession but rather “whether those statements were so manipulative or coercive that they deprived defendant of his ability to make an unconstrained, autonomous decision to confess”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Allen, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting. I concur in the majority’s opinion affirming the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress and its determination that defendant’s right to counsel was not violated. I dissent from the determination that the jury instruction issue was preserved.
While I believed and still believe that State v. Wheelock, 158 Vt. 302 , 609 A.2d 972 (1992), was wrongly decided, it clearly and unequivocally stated that in all future cases “a succinct recitation of specific itemized” objections must be placed on the record following the instructions to the jury, and that the failure to do so is a waiver of an error even if the substance of the objection is made known before the *303 charge. Id. at 306 , 609 A.2d at 975 . This case illustrates the mischief Wheelock created, but I am unaware of any exception to the doctrine of stare decisis which would permit us to deviate from Wheelock’s clear dictate.
I would affirm on all issues.