holding that although counsel's failure to request a cautionary instruction regarding the use of the defendant's prior convictions amounted to ineffectiveness, counsel's actions did not so undermine the truth determining process as to warrant relief under the PCRA where the record was replete with evidence that the defendant had committed the crime in question
How later courts described this case
- holding that although counsel's failure to request a cautionary instruction regarding the use of the defendant's prior convictions amounted to ineffectiveness, counsel's actions did not so undermine the truth determining process as to warrant relief under the PCRA where the record was replete with evidence that the defendant had committed the crime in question
- PCRA court’s vacation of death sentence, based on its conclusion this Court erred when it failed to vacate sentence on direct appeal, was improper; there is no authority “which permits the Courts of Common Pleas of this Commonwealth to overrule the decisions of this Court”
- prosecution's failure to reveal potential bias of witnesses who had pending criminal charges did not entitle defendant to a new trial where there was sufficient other evidence to support the conviction, outside of those witnesses' testimony
- three members of a divided court interpreted the PCRA to require a defendant claiming ineffectiveness of counsel to meet a more demanding standard of prejudice than if he had raised this issue on direct appeal
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299 (1999)
For the following reasons, we decline to follow the plurality opinion in Buehl, but nevertheless reverse the Order of the Superior Court.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Kelly, 555 Pa. 382 (1999)
Thus, the ineffective assistance test, upon which this Court relied in disposing of the claim in Buehl, is inapposite here.
The opinion
NIX, Chief Justice,
concurring.
Although I am in agreement with the criticisms expressed in Mr. Justice Gappy’s dissenting opinion concerning the plurality’s interpretation of the test for ineffectiveness of counsel, I am nonetheless constrained to concur in the denial of Appellant’s petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act. The plurality states that “where a claim of ineffective assistance [of counsel] is advanced on collateral attack, the PCRA renders more stringent the prejudice requirement which must be satisfied before relief can be granted.” Majority op. at 505. For the reasons more fully articulated in Mr. Justice Gappy’s dissenting opinion, I do not believe there exists a substantive distinction between the prejudice prong of the test for ineffectiveness of counsel and the language contained in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii), which requires the defendant to prove that counsel’s ineffectiveness “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” In my view, this language merely reiterates the standard in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153 , 527 A.2d 973 (1987), and its progeny, that “a defendant is required to show that counsel’s ineffectiveness was of such magnitude that the verdict essentially would have been different absent counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 538 Pa. 86, 100 , 645 A.2d 1300, 1308 (1994).
In light of the foregoing, I do not believe that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a cautionary instruction regarding the admission of other crimes evidence. The plurality holds otherwise, but then concludes that counsel’s ineffectiveness did not undermine the truth determining process such that there was no reliable adjudication of Appellant’s guilt or innocence. This conclusion is based upon the circumstantial *516 evidence presented by the Commonwealth which provided overwhelming proof of Appellant’s guilt. It is precisely this evidence which leads me to conclude that Appellant has not met his burden of establishing that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to request a cautionary instruction. Thus, the other evidence of Appellant’s guilt renders counsel’s omission harmless, and therefore, does not entitle him to relief due to counsel’s ineffectiveness. Accordingly, I concur in the result as I believe that the plurality’s attempt to deny relief on the basis of a heightened prejudice standard under in the Post Conviction Relief Act is unwarranted and unnecessary.