The opinion
DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
I respectfully dissent. David Zerby (Claimant) argues that the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) erred in calculating his average weekly wage (AWW) pursuant to section 309(d) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 582(d). Claimant maintains that the WCAB should have calculated his AWW pursuant to section 309(d.1) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 582(d.1), The majority agrees with the WCAB, but I agree with Claimant.
I. Statutory Provisions
Sections 309(d) and 309(d.1) of the Act, 77 P.S. §§ 782(d) & 782(d.1), provide as follows:
(d) If at the time of the injury the wages are fixed by any manner not enumerated in clause (a) [weekly], (b) [monthly] or (c) [yearly], the average week wage shall be calculated by dividing by thirteen the total wages earned in the employ of the employer in each of the highest three of the last four consecutive periods of thirteen calendar weeks in the fifty-two weeks immediately preceding the injury and by averaging the total amounts earned during these three periods.
(d.l) If the employee has not been employed by the employer for at least three consecutive periods of thirteen calendar weeks in the fifty-two weeks immediately preceding the injury, the av *201 erage weekly wage shall be calculated by dividing by thirteen the total wages earned in the employ of the employer for any completed period of thirteen calendar weeks immediately preceding the injury and by averaging the total amounts earned during such periods.
It is apparent that, on its face, section 809(d) of the Act is a general provision that applies to any situation not covered by subsections (a), (b) and (c). Section 309(d.1) of the Act is a special provision that applies where the employee has not been employed by the employer for at least three consecutive periods of thirteen calendar weeks in the fifty-two week period immediately preceding the injury. Thus, if section 309(d.l) is applicable, that section prevails and is construed as an exception to the general rule. Section 1933 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972,1 Pa.C.S. § 1933.
A.Legislative Intent
In considering whether section 309(d.l) applies here, it is necessary to keep in mind that the ultimate goal of the workers’ compensation program is to make the injured employee whole. Colpetzer v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Standard Steel), 802 A.2d 1233 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002). Moreover, the Act must be liberally construed in favor of the injured employee to accomplish the remedial and humanitarian purposes of the Act. Id.
In addition, it is important to remember that the purpose of section 309 of the Act is to establish a baseline figure from which benefits are calculated that reasonably reflect the reality of a claimant’s pre-injury earning experience as a predictor of future earning potential. Triangle Building Center v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Linch), 560 Pa. 540 , 746 A.2d 1108 (2000); Colpetzer . In other words, the task in construing section 309 of the Act is to determine the earning capacity of a claimant who has not yet been injured.
B.Relevant Statutory Definition
Section 309(d.l) of the Act applies if the “employee” has not been employed by the employer for at least three consecutive periods of thirteen calendar weeks in the fifty-two weeks immediately preceding the injury. Section 104 of the Act defines the term “employee” as “[a]ll natural persons who perform services for another for valuable consideration.” 77 P.S. § 22. In other words, “employee” in section 309(d.l) of the Act refers to a person who is actually performing work and earning wages. 1 This definition of the word “employee” means that, in calculating an AWW, it is necessary to exclude periods where the employee was not performing services for valuable consideration. This construction of the word “employee”: (1) is consistent with the purpose of section 309 to establish a realistic predictor of the earning potential of an uninjured claimant; (2) is consistent with the remedial and humanitarian purposes of the Act; and (3) fulfills the ultimate goal of the Act to make the injured employee whole. See Triangle Building Center; Colpetzer.
C.Application
Having considered the purpose of the Act, the purpose of section 309 of the Act and the statutory definition of “employee,” I conclude that section 309(d.l) of the Act applies where the employee has not per *202 formed services for valuable consideration for at least three consecutive periods of thirteen weeks calendar weeks in the fifty-two weeks immediately preceding the injury. Thus, where the employee has not performed services for valuable consideration for three consecutive periods of thirteen weeks due to a prior work-related injury, section S09(d.l) would apply.
II. Prior Case Law
A.Norton
In Norton v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Norton), 764 A.2d 704 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), this court held that the word “employed” in section 309(d.l) of the Act is not limited to the actual days an employee works for wages, but encompasses the period of time that an employment relationship is maintained between the parties. I certainly agree that the word “employed” in section 309(d.1) refers to the maintenance of an employment relationship. Indeed, an employment relationship includes, but is not limited to, situations where: (1) the employee performs services for wages; and (2) the employee receives benefits from the employer during a period when the employee does not work, so long as the employee has not resigned or been terminated. I note that the claimant in Norton was able to perform services for valuable consideration; 2 thus, I would clarify that the word “employed” in section 309(d.1) means maintaining an employment relationship as an employee who is able to perform services for valuable consideration.
B.Merkle
In Merkle v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Hofmann Industries), 796 A.2d 1034 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), the claimant sustained a work injury and returned to work, but the claimant sustained a second work injury shortly thereafter. The claimant’s AWW was calculated under section 309(d) of the Act. The claimant argued that his AWW should have been calculated under section 309(d.1) of the Act because the word “employed” in section 309(d.1) means “worked.” Id. We rejected the claimant’s argument as contrary to Norton. Id.
In deciding Merkle , we did not consider whether the statutory definition of the word “employee” would dictate a different result because Merkle only questioned the meaning of the word “employed.” Because we ordinarily do not address arguments that are not raised by petitioners, there is no reason to overrule Merkle ; however, considering our holding here, Merkle is limited to the particular issue that was raised.
C.Colpetzer
In Colpetzer , as in Merkle , the claimant sustained a work injury and, after returning to work, suffered a second injury. The claimant’s AWW was calculated under section 309(d) of the Act, but the claimant argued that section 309(d.1) of the Act *203 should have been used to calculate his AWW. We rejected the claimant’s argument under Norton .
Although we acknowledged the purpose of the Act and the purpose of section 309 of the Act, we did not consider whether the statutory definition of the word “employee” would dictate a different result. Had we done so, we might have reached a different result. Nevertheless, because we addressed only the issue raised in Colpet-zer, there is no reason to overrule it. We need only indicate that the holding in Col-petzer is limited in precedential value.
III. Section 423
The majority essentially holds that the AWW set forth in a notice of compensation payable (NCP), as long as it has not been modified under section 423 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 771, is the earning capacity of an employee forever. Indeed, the majority suggests that an AWW may not be recalculated for a subsequent injury under section 309(d) of the Act without a showing that the original AWW is materially incorrect. Otherwise, according to the majority, section 309(d) of the Act would conflict with section 423 of the Act. (Majority op. at 11.) I disagree.
To begin, Article IV of the Act governs procedure in workers’ compensation proceedings. Section 423 of the Act simply sets forth the procedure for correcting errors in the AWW shown on a NCP. Article III of the Act governs liability and compensation, and section 309 of the Act simply sets forth the method of computing an injured employee’s wages. There is no conflict between the two provisions. Moreover, the AWW shown on an initial NCP is related solely to the original injury; it is not affected in any way by the calculation of the AWW for a second injury, which would appear on a subsequent NCP.
Judge McGINLEY joins.
. Compare section 306 of the Act, which states that disability benefits shall be a percentage of the "wages of the injured employe as defined in section 309_” 77 P.S. § 511. Thus, the statute makes a distinction between an "employee,” who does not receive benefits because he or she is performing services for valuable consideration, and an "injured employee,” who is entitled to benefits because he or she is not working.
. The claimant was able to work, but the business was shut down. The employment relationship was maintained because, during the shut down, the employer paid the claimant a vacation benefit. Norton . Similarly, in Triangle Building Center , where the claimant was temporarily laid off, the employment relationship was maintained because the claimant called in daily to see if work was available. Cf. Kandala v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 88 Pa.Cmwlth. 199 , 489 A.2d 293 (1985) (holding that a furloughed school teacher is not unemployed during summer months where the teacher receives wages for those months); cf. also Easter Seal Society for Handicapped Children and Adults v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 720 A.2d 217 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) (holding that an academic year employee is not unemployed over summer vacation).