stating that to prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first establish that his or her counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms
How later courts described this case
- stating that to prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first establish that his or her counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms
- holding that defense counsel’s conduct in failing to file notice of an alibi witness despite knowing of the possible testimony well before trial was conduct that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
- holding that trial counsel’s conduct in failing to file notice of an alibi defense despite knowing of the possible testimony well before trial was conduct that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
- holding that a defendant’s failure to present evidence that “establish[es] that the alibi witness would have testified favorably at trial” prevented a determination that counsel’s performance was prejudicial
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*340 Cavanagh, C.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). The purpose of the effective assistance of counsel requirement is to ensure fair trials. Because I believe that the ultimate focus must rest with the fundamental fairness of a trial, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, and not just with the factual accuracy of a trial’s result, I endorse Justice Mallett’s standard as the proper test to be used to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Accordingly, I concur with part i of Justice Mallett’s concurring opinion.
Applying Justice Mallett’s standard to Pickens, I concur with the Court that defendant Pickens was provided effective assistance of counsel.
Applying Justice Mallett’s standard to Wallace, I agree with Justice Levin that, for all the reasons set forth in parts ii and hi of his dissent, defendant Wallace was indeed denied effective assistance of counsel, and is therefore entitled to a new trial. Accordingly, I concur with parts ii and hi of Justice Levin’s dissenting opinion.
Concerning the other two substantive issues raised in Wallace, I adopt Justice Riley’s conclusion that neither the trial judge’s decision to refuse further neurological testing, nor his decision to. admit the disputed rebuttal testimony, taken alone, warrants granting defendant Wallace a new trial. Accordingly, I concur with parts hi and iv of Justice Riley’s majority opinion.