The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Pomeroy:
Although the conduct of the defendant in this case ivas, beyond cavil, reprehensible, I have serious doubt that the Commonwealth sustained its burden to prove that he possessed the required specific intent to ravish. The-,,statute establishing the crime involved reads: “Whoever commits an assault and battery upon a female, with intent, forcibly and against her .will, to have tmlawful carnal knowledge other, is guilty, of a felony. . . .” Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, 18 P.S. §4722 *323 (1963). ■ The defendant’s bullying threats in this case seem to me more akin to Commonwealth v. Shrodes, 354 Pa. 70 , 46 A. 2d 483 (1946) and Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 137 Pa. Superior Ct. 511 , 10 A. 2d 90 (1939) than to Commonwealth v. Moll, 142 Pa. Superior Ct. 519 , 16 A. 2d 324 (1940) and Commonwealth v. Heaton, 145 Pa. Superior Ct. 223 , 20 A. 2d 921 (1941).
However that may be, the volunteered statement of the Commonwealth that “this guy had tried this several times before” was, in my opinion, clearly prejudicial. Despite the clear and prompt admonition of the trial judge that this should be disregarded, I think the damage had been done, and that his instruction could not erase the inflammatory, effect of this positive assertion of prior offenses. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 444-5 (1949). The motion for a mistrial should have been granted, and I would therefore vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial.