explaining that “causes of action and defenses are not interchangeable” and holding that failure to fully litigate defense of release in one action did not bar plaintiff from pursuing breach of contract claim in second action
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “causes of action and defenses are not interchangeable” and holding that failure to fully litigate defense of release in one action did not bar plaintiff from pursuing breach of contract claim in second action
- "Causes of action and defenses are not interchangeable.”
- “To be necessarily determined in the first action, the issue must have been essential to the resulting judgment; a finding upon which the judgment did not depend cannot -4- support collateral estoppel.”
- suits dismissed due to governmental immunity are not a decision on the merits for claim-preclusion purposes
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Reilly, J.
(concurring). The majority holds that the trial court erred in ruling that defendant Schultz was entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7),. (suit barred by res judicata) because, in the intrusive nuisance suit, the most that was decided concerning the parties’ stipulation in Schultz’ earlier negligence action was that "the stipulation did not operate as a release, and so was an unsuccessful defense for the board.” Ante, p 376. I agree with the conclusion that the breach of contract action was not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel, but for a different reason.
In order for the trial court in the intrusive nuisance action to decide whether the defense of release was valid, it was necessary for the trial court to determine the meaning of the stipulation and, in particular, whether the stipulation of the dismissal of Schultz’ claims meant that Schultz would not sue the board on any basis, including a nuisance theory, for damages sustained, by Schultz when his horse was injured by stepping into a hole in a culvert. The trial court interpreted the agreement and ruled that the stipulation only related to the negligence claims raised in the initial lawsuit. On the basis of that ruling, the trial court rejected the defense of release. That ruling, interpreting the stipulation, was not a final order, and could not be appealed as of right.
*382 The intrusive nuisance case was eventually dismissed when the trial court granted the board’s motion for summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity. When the final order granting summary disposition was entered, there was no reason for the board to appeal the earlier interpretation of the stipulation and the order denying its defense of release. The interpretation of the stipulation must be considered only dicta, because it was not necessary for the resolution of the controlling issue upon which summary disposition was granted. Cree Coaches, Inc v Panel Suppliers, Inc, 384 Mich 646 ; 186 NW2d 335 (1971).
Had the interpretation of the stipulation determined the outcome of the intrusive nuisance case, the result would have been different. In that situation, I believe the issue would have been res judicata, and the parties would have been bound by the ruling in future litigation. Under the present circumstances, however, the trial court’s interpretation of the stipulation was merely dicta, and is not binding on the parties in this action.