observing that Pennsylvania does not impose strict liability on prescription drugs “merely because of dangerous propensities of the product”
How later courts described this case
- observing that Pennsylvania does not impose strict liability on prescription drugs “merely because of dangerous propensities of the product”
- describing the issue of prescription drug manufacturer liability as centering on "whether the warning that was given to the prescribing doctors was proper and adequate"
- holding pharmaceutical manufacturers to a high degree of responsibility
- stating strict liability was not applicable to a case involving a prescription drag manufacturer’s alleged failure to properly warn physicians of the dangers involved with taking the drug
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Concubbing Opinion by
Mb. Justice Robebts:
I concur fully in the result reached by the majority and wish only to make explicit my view that a physician is not insulated from malpractice liability merely by possessing and employing the skill and knowledge usually possessed by physicians in the “same or similar locality.” It is also my view that a medical expert is not incompetent to testify as a witness in a malpractice action simply because he does not reside or practice in or otherwise profess a familiarity with the practice of medicine in the same or similar locality.
During the period of its original formulation in the middle and late nineteenth century, the “locality rule” was plausibly expedient. The law was-arguably wise in indulging in the assumption that medical knowledge, skill and care varied considerably from community to community. Thus in the leading case of Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (1880), the Massachusetts Supreme Court sought to protect the rural and small town practitioner by holding that such a practitioner “was not bound to possess that high degree of art and skill possessed by eminent surgeons practicing in large cities.” Id. at 132 .
Present day conditions, however, cast much doubt upon the rule. Modern systems of transportation and communication, the proliferation and widespread dissemination of medical literature, and the prevalence and availability of seminars and postgraduate courses make it both possible and desirable for all practition *299 ers to be reasonably familiar with current medical advances. Furthermore, the major source of a physician’s professional expertise is not the particular locality in which he practices but initially the institutions in which he received his education and professional training.
In light of the foregoing, the locality rule is an anachronism. Massachusetts, one of the original locality rule jurisdictions, has recognized this and abandoned the rule. See Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 , 235 N.E. 2d 793 (1968), overruling Small v. Howard, supra. We should do likewise. The standard of care required of a specialist or general practitioner should be that of a reasonable specialist or general practitioner in similar circumstances practicing medicine in light of present day scientific knowledge. For the same reasons, a medical expert should be deemed a competent witness even if he does not reside or practice in the same or similar locality or is not otherwise familiar with the practice of medicine in the same or similar locality.