allowing insurer to deduct depreciation costs from its actual cash value payment when insurer agreed to pay such costs once the repairs were contracted to be completed
How later courts described this case
- allowing insurer to deduct depreciation costs from its actual cash value payment when insurer agreed to pay such costs once the repairs were contracted to be completed
- “At the core of this present dispute is the meaning of the phrase ‘actual cash value,’ as used [in, inter alia, the Policy].... ”
- “ ![A]ctual cash value’ as used in [the Policy] cannot be synonymous with replacement [cost].”
- providing that such “explicit” and “clear ... qualifying language” satisfies Fedas and its progeny
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GRACI, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.
¶ 1 In typical fashion, the Opinion of the majority provides a thorough and compelling analysis of the complicated factual and legal issues presented in this case. I join its analysis and expression of the law in its entirety and differ from my esteemed colleagues only in the application of the law to the case against Erie.
¶ 2 The learned majority appropriately cites Madison Const. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 557 Pa. 595 , 735 A.2d 100, 106 (1999), for the proposition that a court “must find that ‘contractual terms are ambiguous if they are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation when applied to a particular set of facts.’ ” Opinion, at 1042 (emphasis added). In my view, under the particular set of facts present in this case, the contractual terms which the majority finds ambiguous are not subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Like the language in the *1052 other policies which the majority concludes yields a different result, the language of the Erie policy, under the particular facts present here, requires actual replacement before replacement value is due. The language in the Erie policy is the functional equivalent of that found sufficient in the other policies. Accordingly, in my view, the result should be the same. I would, therefore, affirm the order of the trial court in its entirety.