stating that, if a court considers whether the proposed guardian would be an appropriate person to make future medical decisions for the ward, “no further judicial intervention [is] necessary”
How later courts described this case
- stating that, if a court considers whether the proposed guardian would be an appropriate person to make future medical decisions for the ward, “no further judicial intervention [is] necessary”
- holding this to be “evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
- suggesting that judicial action can sometimes forestall the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from incompetent patients whose wishes are unknown
- "family had no reason to believe that they were surrendering the right to choose among medical alternatives when they placed ... [Mrs. Jobes] in the nursing home"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
O’HERN, J.,
dissenting.
While I dissent from the disposition in this case primarily for the reasons stated in the companion case of In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365 (1987), I reiterate my respect for the aggrieved family and their conscientious decision. I ask them only to consider that the restraints of the law that seem so cruel to them may reflect an equally profound respect for patients not surrounded by a family as loving as theirs. It is not possible for us to construct a substantive principle of law based upon the intact family status. We must construct a substantive principle of law that will endure in all circumstances.
I add only, with respect to the discussion of this case, a concern about a court compelling a health care provider to furnish treatment that is contrary to its own medical standards. I find it difficult to understand how we can order nursing professionals with an abiding respect for their patients to cease to furnish the most basic of human needs to a patient in their care. I do not believe that such an order is essential to the Court’s decision, and it may impinge upon the privacy rights of those nursing professionals. This is not a case in which the physical facilities of a licensed health care provider are being denied to professionals who disagree with the provider’s policy, *454 Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 71 N.J. 478 (1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 , 97 S.Ct. 2987 , 53 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1977); it is a case in which the health care providers firmly believe the treatment is adverse to the patient. I believe a proper balance could be obtained by adhering to the procedure adopted in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 , cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 , 97 S.Ct. 319 , 50 L.Ed.2d 289 (1976), that would have allowed the nonconsenting physician not to participate in the life-terminating process. This was essentially the approach taken by the conscientious treating physician in Kathleen Farrell’s case. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335 (1987).
Applying the principles of In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321 (1985), to this ease, I find that Nancy Jobes’s condition at least is closer to Claire Conroy’s condition than is Hilda Peter’s in that Nancy Jobes has some recognized dim perceptions of reality, and certain nurses believe the patient responds to their presence in her room. But the evidence does not meet the Conroy test of objective distress to the patient; nor is the patient facing an imminent and inevitable death. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
CLIFFORD, HANDLER and POLLOCK, JJ., concurring in result.
For modification and affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 6.
For reversal — Justice O’HERN — 1.