rejecting federal and state constitutional argu ments in favor of separate juries for guilt and penalty phases
How later courts described this case
- rejecting federal and state constitutional argu ments in favor of separate juries for guilt and penalty phases
- defendant's equivocal response to police officer's accusation that defendant committed the crime was admissible since the response was not a tacit admission and the evasiveness of the answers could be utilized by the jury in determining credibility and drawing inferences therefrom
- rejecting federal and state constitutional argu *58 ments in favor of separate juries for guilt and penalty phases
- “Evidence to prove motive, or intent, or plan, or design, or ill will or malice is always admissible.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. DiPietro, 538 Pa. 382 (1994)
However, Jermyn is factually distinguishable.
The opinion
HUTCHINSON, Justice, concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the Court that the jury’s finding of guilt should be affirmed, but do not adopt all its reasoning on that issue. I dissent, however, from its mandate affirming the death sentence. I cannot agree that our Legislature intended to include in the sixth aggravating circumstance the means of death when their use would be an independent felony if death had not occurred. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(6).
Commonwealth v. Williams, 514 Pa. 124 , 522 A.2d 1095 (1987), relied on by the Court, deals with merger of offenses and the related, but distinct, concept of double jeopardy. I do not think it sheds light on the wholly different question of where the Legislature drew the line between the malicious, premeditated killings which define first degree murder and the more limited included class of malicious, premeditated killings which warrant imposition of a death sentence. I would therefore vacate the death sentence and remand to the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County for imposition of a life sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(2).