“[T]his court has held that the two statutes dealing with governmental and sovereign immunities, viz., the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act and the Sovereign Immunity Act, are to be interpreted consistently, as they deal with indistinguishable subject matter.”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]his court has held that the two statutes dealing with governmental and sovereign immunities, viz., the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act and the Sovereign Immunity Act, are to be interpreted consistently, as they deal with indistinguishable subject matter.”
- “Because the legislature’s intent was to provide immunities [to political subdivisions], we have held that the exceptions to immunity must be strictly construed.”
- “Moreover, this [C]ourt has held that the two statutes dealing with governmental and sovereign immunities, viz., the [Tort Claims Act] and the Sovereign Immunity Act, are to be interpreted consistently, as they deal with indistinguishable subject matter.”
- relying on sovereign immunity precedent to evaluate a real estate exception claimed in a governmental immunity case
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Reid v. City of Philadelphia, 77 Pa. D. & C.4th 48 (2005)
Once again, the Grieff decision demonstrates why the negligence caused by an “unidentified” party in Finn is inapposite to the facts in this case which revolve around the City’s negligence.
Distinguished by Abella v. City of Philadelphia, 1997 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 792 (1997)
Abella submits that Finn is distinguishable and therefore not controlling of her case and that the viability of Finn has been undermined by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Grieff v. Reisinger, 548 Pa. 13, 693 A.2d 195 (1997).
Distinguished by Baier v. Franklin Township Volunteer Fire Co., 29 Pa. D. & C.4th 490 (1995)
Finn is inapposite.
The opinion
*610 ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
With the exception of footnote 2 and the reference therein to Kiley v. City of Philadelphia, 537 Pa. 502 , 645 A.2d 184 (1994), a case in which I joined the majority and which I believe is distinguishable from the present case, I join in Justice Cappy’s Dissenting Opinion.
I also note that the majority’s interpretation of this language is apparently at odds with the understanding expressed in the May 1978 Report of the Joint State Government Commission Task Force on Sovereign Immunity, proposing the legislation which, after revision not relevant in this context, became 42 Pa.C.S. § 8501 et seq. The Report’s discussion of the waiver of sovereign immunity 1 in the area of liability related to “Commonwealth Real Estate, Highways and Sidewalks” states, “this area of waiver is intended to impose liability as it would exist if the owner or lessee were a private person.” Id. at 13.
Because I find the majority’s interpretation to be strained, illogical, contrary to the intention of the General Assembly, and apt to foster absurd results, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the Order of the Commonwealth Court.
. As the majority notes, we have held "that the two statutes dealing with governmental and sovereign immunities, viz., the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act and the Sovereign Immunity Act, are to be interpreted consistently, as they deal with indistinguishable subject matter.” Maj. Opinion at 601, citing Kiley, 537 Pa. at 507 , 645 A.2d at 186 ; Crowell v. City of Philadelphia, 531 Pa. 400 , 410 n. 8, 613 A.2d 1178 , 1182 n. 8; and Snyder v. Harmon, 522 Pa. 424 , 435 n. 7, 562 A.2d 307 , 312 n. 7.