holding, however, that killing of accomplice in skirmish was not in furtherance of the undertaking
How later courts described this case
- holding, however, that killing of accomplice in skirmish was not in furtherance of the undertaking
- 6 Justices + 1 judge temporarily assigned
- “Most modern progressive thought in criminal jurisprudence favors restriction rather than expansion of the felony murder rule.”
- “Tort concepts of foreseeability and proximate cause have shallow relevance to culpability for murder in the first degree”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Hughes, C. J.,
dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority here, and would affirm the decision of the Appellate Division, 135 N. J. Super. 224, for the precise reasons stated in its majority opinion. I certainly believe-that what was there referred to as the "ensues clause” can have no other logical or legislatively intended meaning than to extend criminal liability, in a causative sense, to death which ensues or is proximately caused by initiation and furtherance of the felony. This on the concept stated by the Appellate Division:
The proximate cause theory, simply stated, is that when a felon sets in motion a chain of events which were or should have been within his contemplation when the motion was initiated, the felon, and those acting in concert with him, should be held responsible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable consequences results from the initial criminal act. [State v. Canola, 135 N. J. Super. 224, 235 (1975)].
Resistance whether by victim or police, and even unintended or accidental deaths which occur in the confused res gestae of violent felony, can hardly be deemed outside the contemplation of the initiator of such criminal violence.
Sullivan and Pashman, J.J., concurring in the result.
For modification — Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Pashm:an, Clieeord and Schreibbr and Judge Coneord — 6. .
For affirmance — Chief Justice Hughes — 1.