removal of a child from its home requires a finding of clear necessity rather than best interest
How later courts described this case
- removal of a child from its home requires a finding of clear necessity rather than best interest
- emphasizing the importance of disinterested testimony as an ingredient of clear and convincing evidence
- Opinion in Support of Remand by HOFFMAN, J.
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PRICE, Judge
(dissenting):
As in the case of In re: DeSavage, 241 Pa.Super. 174 , 360 A.2d 237 (1975), I would affirm the order of the lower court. As is noted in my dissent therein, we should not engage in word-play so that the judgment of an appellate court may be substituted for that of the low *255 er court. I recognize and admire the compassion and good-will of my colleagues in their efforts, nevertheless, I continue to believe that such efforts are leading to increasingly confusing and contradictory results in our courts and are absolutely unnecessary to the field of law to which they are addressed.
I would affirm on the opinion of the lower court (Tam-ilia, J.) with a single caveat. The lower court opinion refers to the order involved as an “interlocutory order”, and if that characterization is meant to imply that it may not be appealed, I could not accept that concept. The order continued the case for six months and reaffirmed the entrustment agreement. Since it continued the custody of the foster parents for that same period, it is a final order and appealable.
I would affirm the order of the lower court.
VAN der VOORT, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.