The opinion
PELLEGRINI, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the intention of the parties is determinative of whether an article is a fixture regardless of whether the article is attached or affixed to the land.
Wendy Blocker (Plaintiff) attended a performance at the Robin Hood Dell East outdoor concert hall (the Dell) in the City of Philadelphia (City). Plaintiff, using a general admission ticket, chose to sit in the middle of the fourth tier on one of two wooden bleachers in the Dell’s lawn area. Shortly thereafter, the wooden bleacher collapsed and Plaintiff fell backward to the *192 ground. As a result of her fall, Plaintiff suffered injuries to her head, neck, back and extremities. Plaintiff filed a civil action against the City seeking damages for the injuries she sustained as a result of her fall and contending that the City was careless and negligent in maintaining the wooden bleacher. In the new matter of its answer, the City asserted, inter alia, that it was immune from suit because the property did not fall within any exception to governmental immunity contained in what is commonly known as the “Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act” (Tort Immunity Act). 1 The case was initially submitted to a panel of arbitrators.
Before the panel of arbitrators, Warren Haskins (Haskins), general manager for the Dell, among others, 2 testified that there were two wooden bleachers at the Dell that were not attached to the ground and were vestiges from the old seating arrangement that used to be located there. 3 He indicated that the wooden bleachers were about five tiers high, approximately 12 feet wide and stood approximately four to five feet tall. Haskins stated that the bleachers had been removed in approximately 1991 or 1992 because whenever the City had a major event on the Parkway, “the Recreation [Department normally provides all the bleachers and when they need bleachers, they’ll come and salvage them from all over the City,” including from the Dell. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the panel of arbitrators ruled in favor of Plaintiff finding the City 100% liable for her injuries and awarded $33,218.80 in damages. The City appealed the award to the trial court.
Prior to trial, the City filed a motion for summary judgment again contending that the wooden bleacher did not fall within the real property exception to governmental immunity as set forth in section 8542(b)(3) of the Tort Immunity Act 4 because it was not a fixture and attaching Haskins’ testimony before the panel of arbitrators. Granting the City’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court held that the wooden bleacher was not real property under Section 8542(b)(3) of the Tort Immunity Act because, “the bleacher[] in question [cannot] be considered a fixture because [it was] not attached to the ground.”
In In Re Appeal of Sheetz, Inc., 657 A.2d 1011, 1012-13 (Pa.Cmwlth.), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 542 Pa. 653 , 666 A.2d 1060 (1995), this court reviewed the standards to be used in determining whether an article is a fixture stating:
In Clayton v. Lienhard, 312 Pa. 433 , 167 A. 321 (1933), the Supreme Court stated that “chattels” used in connection with real estate are divided into three categories:
Chattels used in connection with real estate are of three classes: First, *193 those which are manifestly furniture, as distinguished from improvements and not peculiarly fitted to the property with which they are used; these always remain personalty. Second, those which are so annexed to the property that they cannot be removed without material injury to the real estate or to themselves; these are realty, even in the face of an expressed intention that they should be considered personalty — to them the ancient maxim “Quiequid planta-tur solo, solo cedit” [Whatever is affixed to the soil, belongs to the soil] applies in full force. Third, those which, although physically connected with the real estate, are so affixed as to be removable without destroying or materially injuring the chattels themselves, or the property to which they are annexed; these become part of the realty or remain personalty, depending upon the intention of the parties at the time of the annexation; in this class fall such chattels as boilers and machinery affixed for the use of an owner or tenant but readily removable .... (Citations omitted.)
In addressing whether chattel or an article of property becomes so affixed to the land that it becomes part of the real estate, we stated in Gore v. Bethlehem Area School District, 113 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 394, 398, 537 A.2d 913, 915 (1988) that:
A fixture is an article in the nature of personal property which has been so annexed to the realty that it is regarded as part and parcel of the land. Black’s Law Dictionary 575 (5th Ed.1979). The considerations to be made in determining whether or not a chattel becomes a fixture include (1) the manner in which it is physically attached or installed, (2) the extent to which it is essential to the permanent use of the building or other improvement, and (3) the intention of the parties who attached or installed it. McCloskey, 101 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 113-4, 515 A.2d at 644 citing Clothier, The Law of Fixtures in Pennsylvania, 32 Pa. B.Q. 66, 66-67 (1960-61). (Footnotes omitted). (Italics in original; bold added).
In reversing the trial court and also quoting from the last part of this quote, particularly the phrase “intention of the parties”, to consider whether an article is a fixture, the majority finds intention paramount to this determination and treats an annexation or being attached to the real property only as another factor to be considered in determining that intent. 5 It is clear from the above quote that the sine qua non that must be met to even determine the intention of the parties is that the article must be annexed or attached to the real property for it to be a fixture. If it is attached, it is only then that the intention of the parties comes into play as to whether they desired that the article be a fixture or not, and that test only applies to the third category of property described in the *194 portion of the Sheetz test quoting from Clayton v. Lienhard. See, e.g., Noll by Noll v. Harrisburg Area YMCA, 537 Pa. 274 , 643 A.2d 81 (1994) (diving board not fixture because attached by “T-handles” and screws that could be easily removed without tools); County of Allegheny v. Fedunok, 164 Pa.Cmwlth. 198 , 642 A.2d 595 , petition for allowance of appeal denied, 538 Pa. 676 , 649 A.2d 677 (1994) (diving board not fixture because easily removed from county pool without destroying it); DeRitis v. City of Philadelphia, 136 Pa.Cmwlth. 244 , 582 A.2d 738 (1990) (bleacher not fixture). 6
This is true even where the object is massive but movable; gravity is insufficient to meet the attachment test and make an object a fixture. Canon-McMillan School District v. Bioni, 127 Pa.Cmwlth. 317 , 561 A.2d 853 (1989) (800-pound lathe not fixture because it was never bolted to floor of industrial arts classroom, removed at least once and secured by gravity and electrical cord); Ma-loney (temporary scaffold not a fixture because moveable and reusable).
Because it is undisputed that the wooden bleacher was not attached to the Dell’s lawn area, it is not a fixture 7 and any negligent maintenance of it does not fall within the real property exception. Accordingly, I dissent. 8
. Act of October 5, 1980, P.L. 693, as amended, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541 and 8542. Section 8541 of the Act provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this sub-chapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.
. Plaintiff also testified as to her injuries and the course of treatment and physical therapy she received for those injuries.
. During his earlier deposition, Haskins testified that the bleachers were "not part of the seating area. They were there [and] sit right outside of a fence area that’s not really considered the lawn area [of the Dell].”
.Section 8542(b)(3) of the Tort Immunity Act provides in relevant part:
(b) Acts which may impose liability. — The following acts by a local agency or any of its employees may result in the imposition of liability on a local agency: ... (3) Real property. — The care, custody or control of real property in the possession of the local agency[.] (Emphasis in original).
We point out that exceptions to immunity are to be strictly construed and narrowly interpreted. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1924; Kiley by Kiley v. City of Philadelphia, 537 Pa. 502 , 645 A.2d 184 (1994).
. The other reason advanced by Plaintiff that the bleacher is a fixture “because of its essential use in a specific business, ... is the article can become part of the real estate, in legal contemplation.” Maloney v. City of Philadelphia, 111 Pa.Cmwlth. 634 , 535 A.2d 209, 212 (1987), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 519 Pa. 669 , 548 A.2d 258 (1988) (citing 16 P.L.E. Fixtures § 1 (1959)) (Emphasis added). Because the wooden bleacher was essential to the operation of the Dell as a concert facility, Plaintiff contends that the wooden bleacher must be a fixture. The key words in the quote that plaintiff relies on “or because of its essential use in a specific business " is a reference to the "assembled industrial plant doctrine.” Under that doctrine, "machinery and equipment necessary for the operation of a plant and placed therein become fixtures, whether or not they are attached to the realty.” Redevelopment Authority of the City of Johnstown v. Yee Kai Teung, 5 Pa.Cmwlth. 65 , 289 A.2d 498, 501 (1972); see also Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 Watts 7 Serg 116 (Pa.1841). However, in Wilson v. Ridgway Area School Dist., 141 Pa.Cmwlth. 607 , 596 A.2d 1161 (1991), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 530 Pa. 650 , 607 A.2d 258 (1992), we held that the doctrine was inapplicable in determining whether an article was a fixture and fell within the real property exception to governmental immunity.
. In DeRitis , because it was undisputed that the bleacher was only a temporary structure and, therefore, not a fixture, we never reached the issue of its attachment to the land upon which it sat.
. Because the wooden bleacher is not a fixture, it remains an article of personal property. In this context, the City's liability is limited to a bailment situation where it would only be held liable for property losses suffered because of the personal property in its care, custody or control. Borough of West Fairview v. Hess, 130 Pa.Cmwlth. 385 , 568 A.2d 709 (1989).
. Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider Grieff v. Reisinger, 548 Pa. 13 , 693 A.2d 195 (1997) and Martin By and Through Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 696 A.2d 909 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997) in ruling on the City’s motion for summary judgment. She asserts that the holdings of these cases govern the outcome here. However, neither Grieff nor Martin are applicable to this case because what was involved in those cases was whether the conduct causing the plaintiffs' injuries fell within the real property exception to governmental immunity and not whether the property itself was the local agency’s real property.