explaining that an order granting a motion to strike a judgment anticipates further litigation, as it places the parties back in the position they were in prior ____________________________________________ 6 See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1701-1799.7. -4- J-S01006-23 to the entry of the judgment
How later courts described this case
- explaining that an order granting a motion to strike a judgment anticipates further litigation, as it places the parties back in the position they were in prior ____________________________________________ 6 See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1701-1799.7. -4- J-S01006-23 to the entry of the judgment
- concluding that where an order striking a default judgment ends the litigation as to all parties and all claims as it necessitates the filing of a new, separate civil action, it is a final order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(b) and an appeal may be taken as of right
- holding that “the common pleas court . . . does not have jurisdiction to alter the [e]mployer’s absolute right to the established subrogation amount as determined by the WCJ”
- explaining that an order granting a motion to strike a judgment generally is not appealable because “[s]uch an order anticipates further litigation” (emphasis added)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DISSENTING OPINION BY
KLEIN, J.:
¶ 1 I acknowledge the thorough discussion of this issue by my distinguished colleague writing for the majority, and agree that in this case it well might be the optimum solution. It is very possible that there is absolutely no defense to the employer’s efforts to reduce the subrogation hen to judgment and Hohider is only trying to stall. However, that does not mean that there may be circumstances where in general there is a defense to reducing a Worker’s Compensation Order to judgment.
¶ 2 For example, suppose that the worker has paid the lien and it just was not recorded in the office of the compensation carrier. Suppose the judgment is improperly being entered against someone else with the same name who had nothing to do with the underlying claim. Suppose, in fact, the Worker’s Compensation was not final and was on appeal to the Commonwealth Court. There probably are many other possible defenses to a claim of judgment following a Worker’s Compensation Court order.
¶ 3 There can be two ways to resolve any possible differences between the employer (or its carrier) and the worker in these cases.
1. The employer or carrier can merely have the Worker’s Compensation order entered as a judgment akin to a confession of judgment, and the worker can petition to open the judgment, raising any defenses to the judgment.
2. The employer or carrier must file what would be expected to be a short form complaint against the worker, and the worker can raise any defenses in an answer. If, as it appears in this case, *20 there are no valid defenses, once the answer is filed the employer or carrier can move for judgment on the pleadings and get its judgment.
¶4 In general, to get a judgment one needs to file a lawsuit. Absent any legislative provisions, the employer would have to file suit. Whether or not this would be the best way in this situation is not for this Court to decide. That is a matter for the legislature, and I believe the legislature by its silence has determined that an employer or carrier must file suit rather than obtain a judgment merely by transferring the Worker’s Compensation order.
¶ 5 Not only is there no common law way to obtain a judgment absent a lawsuit, but here the legislature in crafting the Worker’s Compensation Law did know how to allow a party to merely obtain a judgment by filing a praecipe. The law provides that if a worker gets an award against an employer, the worker can reduce the award to judgment merely by fifing it. At the same time, the law does not provide a similar remedy for employers who have a subrogation award. Therefore, since it is clear the legislature knew how to provide a quick way to enter judgment on an award but did not do so for subrogation awards, my conclusion is that the legislature did not intend to allow employers to have the same easy way to obtain a judgment from an award that they gave to employees.
¶ 6 Although I agree that the majority has presented a viable solution in instances where the employee has no defense to the lien, that solution is not as elegant when the employee does have a defense.
¶ 7 While in this case it may be that Hohider has no defense to the lien, we do not know that because he merely struck the lien as there was no provision to enter it automatically. We recognize that in the majority of cases .there well may not be any defenses, since the Worker’s Compensation Court order cannot be refitigated. However, as noted, there might be other defenses. Under the present procedure, the employer would have to file a lawsuit merely referring to the Worker’s Compensation Court lien. If there is no answer such as the identity of the worker or the fact of payment, then there can be judgment on the pleadings.
¶ 8 It well may be a better solution to allow the employer to file a lien and then require the worker to move to strike the lien raising the substantive defenses at that time. However, it is not up to this Court to craft such a remedy, but up to the legislature.
¶ 9 Because I believe that the Worker’s Compensation Act is clear about who is allowed to enter a judgment in summary fashion and because Hohider has not been required to show that fie has an arguably valid defense to the lien, I must agree with the trial judge that the employer has to file a lawsuit to obtain a judgment on the subrogation award and would affirm his’ order. Accordingly, I must dissent.