The opinion
Kelly, J.
{dissenting). Justice Souris affirms the workmen’s compensation appeal board under part 2 of the act, * and states: “Such conclusion renders unnecessary any discussion of the applicability of part 7 to the facts of this case.”
*595 ' James H. McLaughlin, chairman of the workmen’s compensation appeal board, found that defendant’s foreman was “riding” and “wrangling” with plaintiff, and that plaintiff was entitled to receive compensation under part 7 of the act, stating:
“Plaintiff sustained a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment and due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the business of his employer. The conditions of plaintiff’s employment involved a hazard greater and different from that to which the public is generally exposed.”
Commissioner Storie decided plaintiff was entitled to an award under part 2 and repudiated Chairman McLaughlin’s finding under part 7, stating:
“Such finding by Chairman McLaughlin was predicated to a large extent on conditions which he finds were created by the ‘wrangling’ between the foreman and the plaintiff. I do not agree with Chairman McLaughlin. * * *
“The tempo of the burring job was faster than plaintiff had been accustomed, however, when weighed in the light of employment in general I must conclude as did Member Ryan that there was nothing about the burring job which could he said to create causes and conditions which were characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the defendant employer. * * * Compared to employment in general within manufacturing establishments this was a relatively simple task that required no unusual lifting, turning or twisting. When weighed, in the test of involving a hazard greater and different from that to be found in employment in general then a holding of causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to this employer’s business must fail. Since there is no showing that there were ‘causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer’ I hold plaintiff’s claim is not compensable *596 tinder the provisions of part 7 of the workmen’s compensation act.”
Commissioner Ryan in his opinion stated:
“The plaintiff’s medical testimony indicates that he has had, for many years, a personality predisposition to the development of a schizophrenic psychosis. He started working on the job in question on October 12,1956. It was an ordinary job. There was nothing about it that presented any special or distinguishing hazard of mental strain. The difficulty that developed grew out of his refusal to comply with specific and reasonable instructions from his foreman. He felt that-he could do the work faster by doing it in his way although the record does not indicate why his way would be faster. His psychosis commenced on about the 5th day with the complete breakdown following on about the 10th day. It clearly was related by way of precipitation to his feeling that he could not keep up his work and follow his foreman’s instructions.
“Chairman McLaughlin grants compensation under part 7. Section 1 of that part defines personal injury to ‘include a disease or disability which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer and which arises out of and in the course of the employment.’
“The accepted test of compensability under part 7 has been whether or not the conditions of employment result in a hazard which distinguishes it in character from the general run of occupations. * * #
“In this case there was no special or distinguishing hazard or anything out of the ordinary in the way of duty-risk insofar as the plaintiff’s job was concerned. All that emanated from the job was the giving of simple instructions by the foreman to the plaintiff for the performance of a simple job. I do not agree that the plaintiff’s disability is due to *597 ■causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to, the defendant’s business.
“Member Storie grants compensation under part '2. He is in accord with me in finding that the plaintiff’s disability is not due to causes and conditions ■characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer but he grants compensation under part 2 with the finding that the disability arose out of and in the course of the employment. I disagree with the latter finding. I do not believe that the injury arose ■out of the employment. * * *
“I do not believe that the plaintiff’s disability arose ■out of his employment because of the total picture presented by the following considerations:
“There is nothing in this case identifiable as an ■occupational risk.
“The job was a simple job and the foreman’s instructions were even simpler. Nothing more emanated from the employment.
“The disability arose out of the plaintiff’s own feelings and misapprehension and from within himself completely. * * *
“Nevertheless, compensation is being granted and a more extreme case is not apt to be encountered. I do not believe that workmen’s compensation was ever intended to cover this kind of a situation.”
Defendant’s position is set forth in its brief as follows :
“It would seem to us that if the plaintiff is to recover in this case he would have to meet the requirements of part 7. There is no one thing or event which is claimed in this case. This can be seen from the testimony and from the application for compensation. * * *
“The testimony does not indicate that plaintiff’s disability is due to causes and conditions peculiar to his employment. His disability is due to and arises out of his mental condition. * * *
: “The plaintiff’s job was a simple one, and the instructions were simple also. • There was no special *598 and distinguishing hazard on plaintiff’s job. It is ¡very apparent that the plaintiff had a very unrealistic attitude towards his job due to his personality disorder. "We do not think that there should be liability in cases where an employee, by reason of his delusions, should feel trapped or feel insecure in his job. This could lead to liability in cases where the disability results from conditions which are built up in the mind of the employee. An employee might brood over not getting a raise, feeling that his boss did not like him, and could get compensation despite the fact that this may not be the true situation.
“We also contend that the workmen’s compensation appeal board by majority opinion has made , a finding of fact in this case that there is no liability under part 7.
“Under section 12, part 3, of the workmen’s compensation law (CL 1948, § 413.12 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.186]), such findings of fact are conclusive. * * *
“Liability under part 2, which is found by Member '■Storie, seems to be based on the premise that the unusual result of the occupation is an injury under part 2. We would say that the unusual result, if there is one, would be caused by the condition of plaintiff’s mind and not by his occupation. We say again, however, that there being no single event alleged or found by the workmen’s compensation appeal board that part 2 does not apply. Plaintiff’s claim is predicated entirely on the conditions of his job. An injury under either part 2 or part 7 must arise out of and in the course of the employment.”
Part 7, §1, subd c (CL 1948, §417.1 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.220]), reads:
“The term ‘personal injury’ shall include a disease or disability which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer and which arises out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the public is generally exposed outside *599 of the employment shall not be compensable: Provided, however, That a hernia to be compensable must be clearly recent in origin and result from a strain arising out of and in the course of the employ- . ment and promptly reported to the employer.”
■ Justice Souris refers to decisions from Michigan and from other jurisdictions to sustain his opinion. An analysis of these cited cases discloses that while they, sustain the compensability of emotional disability, in each instance there was some precipitating factor as disclosed by the following:
Plaintiff’s husband’s death resulted from shock •caused by dropping an object on a fellow employee, .knocking said fellow employee unconscious (Klein v. Len H. Darling Co., 217 Mich 485 ); plaintiff became •emotionally disabled after a piece of hot metal entered his glove (Karwacki v. General Motors Corporation, 293 Mich 355 ); plaintiff, after suffering the loss of an eye by an occupational injury, developed a post traumatic neurosis and was unable to work (Hayes v. Detroit Steel Casting Co., 328 Mich 609 ); plaintiff was injured when a 15- to 20-pound steel weight struck her between her shoulder blades and .she. subsequently suffered conversion hysteria (Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co., 353 Mich 286 ); plaintiff and 30 other employees suffered mass hysteria caused by an odor of gasoline vapor, after which plaintiff was unable to work because of dizziness (Rainko v. Webster-Eisenlohr, Inc., 306 Mich 328 ); plaintiff’s husband died from shock and excitement and overexertion in attempting to pull a fire from a boiler in order to prevent an explosion (Monk v. Charcoal Iron Co. of America, 246 Mich 193 ); plaintiff tried to lift a 25-pound tray of cards and suffered an injury when she attempted to yank it free (Shephard v. Michigan National Bank, 348 Mich 577 ); *600 plaintiff suffered an injury when he exerted great effort to tighten a load hinder (Coombe v. Penegor, 348 Mich 635 ).
The final Michigan case cited by Mr. Justice Souris, La Veck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 190 Mich 604 (LRA1916D, 1277), is the only case where there was not an overt act or a direct physical injury leading to neurosis. In this case claimant was awarded compensation for a cerebral hemorrhage induced tjy heat and overexertion. The court held that since evidence that tends to sustain a determination of the-industrial accident board is not subject to review,'in appellate proceedings, on writ of certiorari to review the award of compensation for paralysis'lhat resulted from heat and excessive exertion rupturing-a small blood vessel of the brain (claimant having-suffered from arteriosclerosis for 2 years prior to his injury), the question whether it was caused by' an accident arising out of or in the course of claimant’s-employment was for the lower tribunal and would' not be reversed unless a total lack of evidence upon: that issue was disclosed.
Justice Souris cites 4 decisions from other jurisdictions to sustain his opinion, and the following briefing of the facts in those cases, I believe, discloses they are dissimilar to the facts in our present appeal. Plaintiff-claimant’s fellow worker fell off a scaffold to his death and plaintiff, who was almost killed, was subsequently unable to work at heights (Bailey v. American General Insurance Co., 154 Texas 430 [ 279 SW2d 315 ]); plaintiff suffered a traumatic neurosis and could no longer work, her neurosis being caused from fright when a short circuit from a motor caused a flash (Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va 204 [ 13 SE2d 291 ]); plaintiff suffered paralysis caused- solely from fright when lightning ■ struck the building and blew out' 3 motors* near' ia *601 machine at which she was sitting (Charon’s Case, 321 Mass 694 [ 75 NE2d 511 ]).
The final of the 4 out-State decisions Justice Souris cites (Montgomery v. State Compensation Commissioner, 116 W Va 44 [ 178 SE 425 ]) dealt with a miner who became lost in a mine- and thereafter suffered shock and exhaustion. In granting compensation the West Virginia court stated (pp 46, 47].
“It is clear that the term ‘personal injury’- as used in' the workmen’s compensation act of this.- Státe contemplates and includes the result of unusual exposure, shock, exhaustion, and other conditions not of traumatic origin provided that they are attributable to a specific and definite event arising in the course of and resulting from the employment. We think therefore that the condition in which Montgomery found himself as a consequence of getting lost in the mine is an injury within the meaning of the compensation act inasmuch as it is attributable to a specific and definite, event.”
Justice Souris, after stating that:
“What distinguishes the case at bar from our other decisions which recognize the compensability of such disabilities is that this plaintiff’s disability was caused by neither a single physical injury to plaintiff nor by a single mental shock to him. Instead, his disability was caused by emotional pressures produced by production line employment not shown by him to be unusual in any respect, — that is, not shown by him to be any different from the emotional pressures encountered by his- fellow- workers in similar employment. As noted above, the finding of causal relationship between plaintiff’s .disability an.d the pressures of his employment was- supported by the evidence. The question then becomes, .must industry,, under our. laws, bear the economic burden of such disability ?”
*602 answers the question by saying:
“We make no claim that it is universally held that a mental disorder which is precipitated solely by a mental stimulus, as opposed to a physical impact, is considered a compensable personal injury. There are those jurisdictions in which no nervous disorder is compensable.”
and he cites and briefly quotes from Indiana, New Jersey, and New York decisions.
I quote more completely from the Indiana and New York decisions. In McGill Manufacturing Company, Inc., v. Dodd, 116 Ind App 66 ( 59 NE2d 899 ), it was held (syllabi):
“A condition diagnosed as spastica torticollis, commonly known as wryneck, and which was a neurosis, was not incidental to the work of claimant who was engaged in operating a bore-grinding machine, for a neurosis is an ailment to which the general public is exposed outside such employment.”
“The occupational diseases act was not intended to provide general health insurance to the workman, but to compensate him for disability resulting only from a disease incidental to the character of the business in which he is employed and having its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to exclude from the protection of the act workmen suffering from diseases arising out of a hazard to which workmen would have been equally exposed outside their employment and independent of the relation of employer and employee.”
“The occupational diseases act does not extend its protection to those workmen who suffer from outward manifestations and symptoms of many possible vagaries and aberrations of the human mind which, although having some causal connection with an employment are, nevertheless, ills all human flesh is 'heir to, unless, in such cases, the causative inducing *603 the mental condition be an intervening occupational disease, as defined by the act.”
In Chernin v. Progress Service Co., Inc., 9 App Div 2d 170 ( 192 NYS2d 758 ), a cab driver hit a pedestrian but did not suffer any physical injury to himself. However, he suffered a mental disorder and sought compensation. The New York court held (p 172):
“The question here is novel as it apparently has not heretofore been decided by the courts. Larson on Workmen’s Compensation Law has little text on the subject but cites a New Jersey case, Voss v. Prudential Insurance Co., 14 NJ Misc 791 (187 A 334), where a stenographer was called an ‘idiot’ by a coworker, became upset thereby and subsequently, was treated for a nervous spell. That court determined there was no accident arising out of and in the course of her employment.
“While it may accurately be claimed the facts would be sufficient to sustain the board if the injury were of a physical nature, we find the present facts not compensable under the law. Heart cases come closest to the present situation where a pre-existing condition was aggravated but there has always been a physical reaction — damage to the heart — as distinguished from mental. Furthermore, the rule in heart cases has been extended with great liberality, but the happening of some external event in connection with the work and causing the heart condition has been required. Lesnik v. National Carloading Corp., 285 App Div 649, 651 ( 140 NYS2d 907 ), affirmed 309 NY 958 ( 132 NE2d 326 ).
“We find nothing in the law that connotes purely excessive emotions — anger, grief or other mental feelings — unaccompanied by physical force or exertion can be the basis of an accident. The record, here discloses that claimant became angry which resulted in an emotional strain and superimposed upon a pre-existing mental condition resulted in the; claimant’s disability. '
*604 “It may logically be argued that claimant here is just as disabled as someone suffering from a physical ■disability. This we do not dispute but it does not, at present, constitute an accident as defined by the workmen’s compensation law. It is not within our province to decide otherwise.
“The board in their memorandum decision conceded there was no ‘physical hurt’ but the findings conclude he became emotionally disturbed as the result of questions by the police and that due to the emotional episode and psychological trauma he sustained an exaggeration of a pre-existing emotional disorder which resulted in schizophrenia, paranoid type.
“For the reason herein stated, the finding of the board that it was an accidental injury within the provisions of the workmen’s compensation law should be reversed and the claim dismissed.”
Justice Souris refers to Klein v. Len H. Darling Co., supra, as Michigan precedent and quotes the concurring opinion of Justice Wiest. The following sentence in Justice Wiest’s opinion (p 495) clearly distinguishes the Klein Case from our present appeal:
“An accident happened in which the deceased was an actor, and the shock to him was so acute, and so depressed his vital forces as to kill him.”
Karwacki v. General Motors Corporation, supra, is cited to establish that “a pre-existing' latent mental disturbance” is not a bar to compensation, but the Karwacki Case is not similar to the instant case as is disclosed by the following statement in the opinion:
“The testimony * * * supports the finding of the department that the accidental injury aggravated a pre-existing latent mental disturbance, resulting in a disabling condition.”
*605 In deciding this appeal we cannot forget the fact that a majority of the commission found there was no accident and plaintiff, while performing a simple job comparable to others employed, suffered a mental breakdown because he could not adequately perform that simple job.
Sheppard v. Michigan National Bank and Coombe v. Penegor, supra, are majored in Justice Souris’ opinion with the statement that it does not appear “that injuries not attributable to a single event are not covered by part 2.” I do not believe either of these cases is of compelling weight, because in both cases there was a single precipitating event and in neither case did we have a plaintiff that possessed such a mentality as to cause him to lose all control of himself without any accidental or unusual event.
Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co., supra, is referred to as this Court’s most recent statement respecting compensability of a neurotic condition. Suffice to say, in a 5-to-3 decision we held that a neurosis developing from an injury is compensable if directly caused thereby and not collateral thereto. There was no injury or comparable facts in this present appeal.
Defendant submits 2 questions in its statement of questions involved:
“1. Is the plaintiff’s disability the result of a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment under either part 2 or part 7 of the Michigan workmen’s compensation law?”
My answer to question No. 1 is “No.”
“2. Is there any competent evidence in the record to sustain the finding of the workmen’s compensation appeal board that the plaintiff is entitled to continuing compensation?”
*606 The hearing referee (James A. Broderick) -found “that said defendant pay compensation at the rate -of $36 per week for total disability to said employee from October 24, 1956, to January 7, 1957, inclusive; and, that said defendant shall reimburse said em.ployee $863.27 for medical and hospital care.”
Appellee’s position on this point is set forth in his brief as follows:
“The undisputed medical testimony accepted by the appeal board relative to disability was presented by the treating physician, Dr. Tourkow: Plaintiff should not be employed on a job which is highly competitive. He should be placed upon a job where he would have to maintain a certain rate of production. He certainly would not be employable in piece work. The type of job that Dr. Tourkow felt that the plaintiff would be able to handle would be a job where he would be able to function at his own level of production without having to push himself. Dr. Tourkow testified that plaintiff was well motivated toward working; that plaintiff actually wanted to work but that he- would advise very strongly against anything which would resemble the competitive situation which produced plaintiff’s psychotic break. * * *
“The plaintiff has been able to do a certain amount of casual farm labor, but that is a far cry from a competitive production-line job. Because of the very nature of plaintiff’s disability, the plaintiff himself is incapable of making a reliable judgment as to his own capacity. * * *
“The plaintiff’s right to compensation for a disability does not depend upon his being totally disabled from doing any work but on his being disabled from earning full wages in the work in which he was last-subjected to the conditions resulting in his disability. * * *
. “The appeal board has made a finding of. fact, a finding based on uncontradictéd testimony.. Defendant should not now be permitted to circumvent the *607 appeal board’s finding on this or any other factual issue.”
The 3 members of the board filed lengthy opinions hut only briefly referred to continuing disability.
Chairman McLaughlin found:
“Plaintiff contends that he did sustain such an injury and that he is entitled to compensation beyond January 7, 1957, and until further order of the department.
“We find as follows: Prior to October, 1956, plaintiff had a personality configuration which made him particularly susceptible to the development of a schizophrenic psychosis. Nevertheless plaintiff had suffered no mental breakdown and had not been out of touch with reality prior to October 24,1956. There was no psychosis before such date. * * * The date of injury and date of disablement is October 24,1956. As the result of the injury plaintiff has been totally disabled since October 24,1956, from doing the work he was performing for defendant prior to that date. * * *
“The award of the hearing referee shall he modified to thus provide, for continuing compensation from and after January 7, 1957, the date on which the referee stopped compensation.”
Commissioner Storie stated:
“The record is void of any showing of other ‘events’ which could reasonably be held to have been the precipitating cause of plaintiff’s disability. It is evident that this well-qualified medical witness is of the opinion that the events created by and encountered during the course of the employment could have been ‘the straw that breaks the camel’s hack’ in the instant case. We then clearly have a ■ disability and an unexpected result that arose out of and in the course of this employee’s employment with defendant company. * * *
*608 “From the proofs presented it would be mere speculation for us to hold that plaintiff would have been disabled because of the pre-existing condition ■even though he had not been employed by defendant company. There are no suggested reasons for plaintiff’s mental breakdown other than those which did occur during the course of his employment. * * * Since plaintiff’s capacity to earn cannot be measured against his incapacity the continuing award entered by the hearing referee is proper.”
As hereinbefore noted, Commissioner Ryan found that plaintiff was not entitled to compensation.
Plaintiff’s exhibit 1 was a statement of Dr. Warner to the president of Local 235, under date of January 29, 1957, in which he said:
“Mr. James Carter was hospitalized at St. Clair Hospital from 10-27-56 to 11-23-56. During his hospitalization he was treated for a nervous disorder which we have not been able to diagnose. He was given a thorough physical examination and was found to be in excellent condition. * * *
“Our last contact with him was on January 21st, and he was physically fit to return to his employment.”
Dr. Tourkow referred to the St. Clair Hospital diagnosis as follows:
“Well, actually, this was the diagnosis they arrived at at St. Clair Hospital, was paranoiac schizophrenia, and it certainly would be in keeping with these progressively developing feelings that the foreman was persecuting him, you see. Right now I don’t see any evidence of paranoid schizophrenia per se. I do see some very minimal left over of a schizophrenic process, but really if you didn’t know that the person had had this before, you wouldn’t make a diagnosis solely on the symptoms. So this is why I used the term ‘in remission’ in my present diagnosis. In remission means that he’s now not psychotic, he’s not showing any symptoms right now.”
*609 The record discloses that plaintiff had this personality disorder all his life. He proved that he conld not adjust to rules or regulations while in the army, hut repeatedly went absent without leave.
I agree with appellant’s statement that: “The testimony does not indicate that plaintiff’s disability is due to causes and conditions peculiar to his employment. His disability is due to and arises out of his mental condition.” And, I also agree with appellant that the answer to its question No. 2 should be “No,” and conclude that the decision of the workmen’s compensation appeal board should be reversed.
The award should be reversed. No costs.
Dethmers, C. J., and Carr, J., concurred with Kelly, J.
CL 1948 an~ CLS 1956, § 411.1 et seq. (Stat Ann 1950 Rev and Stat Ann 1957 Cum Supp § 17.141 et seq.).