Absent direct evidence of which of two defendants in a first degree murder trial shot the victim, defendant’s words subsequent to the murder, established his culpability as an accomplice.
How later courts described this case
- Absent direct evidence of which of two defendants in a first degree murder trial shot the victim, defendant’s words subsequent to the murder, established his culpability as an accomplice.
- requisite mental state for the crime with which accomplice is charged must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to be one which accomplice harbored and cannot depend upon proof of mental state of principal
- accomplice may be convicted only of crime for which he harbored requisite mental state, but existence of shared criminal intent may be inferred from all attendant circumstances
- “[T]he requisite mental state must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to be one which the accomplice harbored and cannot depend upon proof of intent to kill only in the principal.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBERTS, Justice,
concurring.
It is well settled that the use of a gun on a vital part of the deceased’s body raises the presumption of a specific intent to kill. See Commonwealth v. Thornton, 494 Pa. 260 , 431 A.2d 248 (1981); Commonwealth v. Ewing, 439, Pa. 88, 264 A.2d 661 (1970). Here the Commonwealth’s evidence established that the cause of the victim’s death was a gunshot wound to the chest inflicted by appellant’s accomplice. This evidence, together with the evidence of the actors’ shared intent, amply permitted the jury to find appellant guilty of murder of the first degree.
As to the claim of error in refusing to grant appellant’s motion for a change of venue, the record of voir dire reveals that, although the community was quite familiar with the killing, the percentage of prospective jurors excused because of a fixed opinion on guilt did not rise to a level indicative of prejudice. Compare Commonwealth v. Cohen, 489 Pa. 167 , 413 A.2d 1066 (1980). Thus the court did not commit reversible error in denying the requested motion.
As the judgment of sentence of murder of the first degree was properly imposed, I concur in the reinstatement of that judgment.
O’BRIEN, C.J., joins in this concurring opinion.