holding that if trial counsel was not ineffective with respect to claim underlying allegation of ineffectiveness, then appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
How later courts described this case
- holding that if trial counsel was not ineffective with respect to claim underlying allegation of ineffectiveness, then appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
- holding that evidence of the same type of non-charged conduct was admissible to show the :full extent and scope of the conspiracy
- stating that a jury is presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions
- “It is settled that the test for counsel ineffectiveness is the same under both the Pennsylvania and Federal Constitutions: it is the performance and prejudice test set forth in Strickland v. Washington (quoting Commonwealth v. Gribble, 580 Pa. 647, 863 A.2d 455, 460 (2004
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice FITZGERALD,
concurring.
I join fully in the majority’s analysis and conclusion affirming the PCRA court’s order vacating appellee’s Pa.C.O.A. conviction, and remanding to the PCRA court for consideration of most of his collateral claims pursuant to our decision in Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574 , 832 A.2d 1014 (2003). I also join in the majority’s conclusion that trial and direct appeal counsel were not ineffective for failing to raise Besch-related claims, and in the majority’s subsequent finding that the admission of the evidence challenged by appellee “cannot be deemed prejudicial where the jury expressly found appellee criminally responsible for only the murders and robberies in which he was the actual shooter.” M.O. at 396, 936 A.2d at 30. As the majority notes, “the jury obviously rejected the evidence submitted in support of [the five unfounded predicate] acts.” Id. As a result of the jury’s acquit *408 ting appellee of crimes in which he was not the shooter, I agree that appellee was not prejudiced by the admission of evidence unrelated to the murders of Gavin Anderson, Kevin Anderson, and Otis Reynolds. Because I believe that this would be a sufficient basis upon which to find a lack of Strickland/Pierce prejudice, I see no need to address the specific admissibility of each piece of evidence challenged by appellee. Accordingly, I decline to join that portion of the majority opinion.
Justice BAER joins this concurring opinion.