The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
President Judge Crumlish, Jr:
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the claimant presented *637 competent evidence of a health-based necessitous and compelling cause for her quit.
The majority concludes that the claimants testimony alone satisfies the competent evidence standard set forth in Deiss v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 475 Pa. 547 , 381 A.2d 132 (1977). As support for this, it quotes a statement in Judd v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 91 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 372 , 496 A.2d 1377 (1985), that compelling medical reasons for a quit may be established “by any competent evidence such as claimants own testimony and/or documentary evidence.” Id. at 376 , 496 A.2d at 1379 (emphasis added). I cannot agree with the interpretation the majority gives to this language.
The quoted passage from Judd cites Steffy v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 499 Pa. 367 , 453 A.2d 591 (1982). The clear import of Steffy is that where the sole testimony presented by a claimant is his own, the Deiss competent evidence requirement may be satisfied if this testimony is accompanied by supporting documents. 1 The majority’s interpretation of Judd directly conflicts with Steffy . Considering the Judd Court’s reliance upon Steffy , I interpret the use of the disjunctive “or” in the quoted passage to mean that *638 a claimant may produce competent evidence consisting either of (1) his testimony and supporting documents, or (2) documentary evidence alone. 2
1 would conclude that this claimant did not produce competent evidence that her quit was necessitated by a work-related illness. Documentary evidence must “support [a claimants] contention that at the time of termination his health precluded him from performing his assigned duties.” Carroll v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 69 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 62, 64 , 450 A.2d 280, 281 (1982) (emphasis in original). The only document submitted here was a physicians letter stating that the claimant “relate[d] disappearance of the [headaches] since the time she quit her employment.” The letter does not establish that the headaches were so severe and untreatable as to necessitate the claimants quit. Therefore, as a matter of law, this document does not support the claimants assertion that the headaches compelled her to resign.
Accordingly, I would reverse the Boards decision granting benefits.
The Steffy Court stated: “The distinction between competent evidence’ under Deiss and the ‘competent medical evidence’ requirement articulated in the opinion of the court below is vital. The former is a broader standard which allows an applicant to meet the burden with his own testimony and supporting documents. The latter is a more stringent requirement which could result in the denial of benefits simply because an applicant foils to provide the expert testimony of a physician even where such testimony would be superfluous or cumulative. The broader standard more effectively comports with this Court’s view that the Unemployment Compensation Law must be liberally and broadly construed.” Id. at 372 , 453 A.2d at 594 (emphasis added).
Moreover, even if the majority’s interpretation of Judd is accurate, the quoted pássage is mere dicta — and, therefore, lacks precedential value — because the Judd Court concluded that the ailment there (emotional distress) “was established ... by claimant’s own testimony and documentary evidence.” Id. at 376 , 496 A.2d at 1379 (emphasis added).