The opinion
CERCONE, President Judge,
dissenting:
Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to medical malpractice cases in Pennsylvania, I would affirm the order and judgment of the lower court that applied the doctrine to the facts in this case. Therefore, I dissent.
*384 Under Restatement (Second) of Torts, one of the three prongs that must be satisfied before res ipsa loquitur applies in a case is that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that “other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence.” § 328D(l)(b). In the instant case, Mary Belle Jones underwent three surgical procedures that required three different positions on the operating table to facilitate each process. Expert testimony disclosed that Mary Belle’s shoulder injury was most probably the result of the malpositioning during one of the three positions in the operating room. (R. 230a, 236a-237a.) By his own admission, Dr. Beittel stated that it was his duty as the operating physician to “preserve” the patient neurologically during the course of the surgery, (R. 117a), and further expert testimony showed that it was the duty of the operating surgeon to monitor the position of the patient. (R. 406a-407a.) The majority concludes that since one of the three surgical procedures was performed by Dr. Rohrabaugh, he became the operating physician and was then responsible for the patient’s position at that time thus relieving Dr. Beittel of his duty. From this, the majority states that the record does not support, as a matter of law, the exclusion of Dr. Rohrabaugh as an “other responsible cause” under § 328D(l)(b) of the Restatement.
I cannot agree with the majority’s evaluation of the record. Although one of the surgical procedures, the laparoscopy, was performed by Dr. Rohrabaugh, there is no evidence that Dr. Beittel’s duty to monitor the patient ever terminated. Dr. Beittel testified that he was present in the operating room during the laparoscopy and that he “did, indeed, look through the laparoscope.” (R. 86a, 92a.) Dr. Rohrabaugh testified that:
“As best I can recall it, we actually consulted each other during the laparoscopy rather than to say it was done after. As I was looking through the laparoscope, . I . would have him [Dr. Beittel] actually look through the laparoscope over my shoulder so that he can *385 see what I am talking about and so that in actuality the consultation that went on took place during the actual procedure not as a separate time entity.” (R. 268a 269a).
Exclusive control need not be proved in order to find liability under § 328D. Instead, the critical inquiry is “whether a particular defendant is the responsible cause of the injury.” Gilbert v. Korvette’s Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 614 , 327 A.2d 94, 101 (1974) (Emphasis supplied).
Based on the above-mentioned evidence of Dr. Beittel’s active participation in the entire surgical procedure, I would find the plaintiff had sufficiently proved that Dr. Beittel continued to be the “responsible cause,” which was not terminated by Dr. Rohrabaugh’s participation during the surgical procedures. 1
. The majority does not discuss the other two requirements of § 328D that the event must be the kind “which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence,” and “the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.” Both of these requirements are adequately satisfied through Dr. Beittel’s own admission that he had the duty to preserve the patient neurologically (R. 117a), and further expert testimony that the injury did not usually occur without negligence. (R. 212a.)
. There is some question as to whether the phrase res ipsa loquitur should be labelled a doctrine. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 39, p. 213 and n. 72 (4th ed. 1971).