recognizing "the public policy of this State is that public entities shall be liable for their negligence only as set forth in the [TCA]"
How later courts described this case
- recognizing "the public policy of this State is that public entities shall be liable for their negligence only as set forth in the [TCA]"
- noting that general "liability [for ministerial acts] yields to a grant of immunity" under N.J.S.A. 59:5-4, citing Wuethrich, supra, 155 N.J. Super. at 326
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLIFFORD, J.,
concurring.
The Society for the Preservation of Linguistic Hygiene should come to the rescue of the so-called “weather immunity” statute. In enacting N.J.S.A. 59:4-7 the legislature resorted to particularly unfortunate language. Containing only one sentence of twenty-eight words, the statute relieves a public entity of liability for “an injury caused solely by the effect * * * of weather conditions.” It seems to me that the statute does no more than state the obvious, for if the injury results solely and exclusively from weather conditions, there could be no actionable claim against anyone. That is the old “act of God” defense.
Although I join entirely in the opinion of the Court, I think we would do well to take a stand against verbal pollution, particularly by avoiding the label of “weather immunity.” The statute does not confer immunity, for there is no liability to immunize against if a claimant’s injuries find their cause solely in the weather conditions. I suppose what is meant is that there is no duty to clean up those conditions of streets and highways that are produced by storms and the like, and I suppose too that the Court is correct in reading some sense into the statute. And I suppose, finally, that this little legislative lapse is not. worth losing much sleep over. But I do wish someone would clean up the act.
For reversal and remandment — Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 5.
Concurring in result — Justice CLIFFORD — 1.