holding “that no legal proceedings are necessary in the great majority of cases involving the termination of life sustaining treatment to persons in [the instant patient’s] condition,” namely, a persistent vegetative state
How later courts described this case
- holding “that no legal proceedings are necessary in the great majority of cases involving the termination of life sustaining treatment to persons in [the instant patient’s] condition,” namely, a persistent vegetative state
- “eight of the nine justices [in Cruzan] found a federal due process liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment”
- "[T]here is no need for a court to intervene in this decisionmaking process unless there is disagreement between the interested parties, who are usually identified as the medical professionals involved in treating and evaluating the patient and the patient's family or guardian."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
OLSZEWSKI, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s thoughtful opinion in all respects. I feel that one aspect of the concurring and dissenting opinion merits a brief response.
The majority uses the individual’s right to privacy and self-determination as the starting point in its analysis, and concludes that in the narrow fact situation before us, the legal system will not aid in the difficult decision of when to terminate life support. The dissent arrives at a different conclusion by beginning its analysis with the Commonwealth’s duty as parens patriae of its citizens. This obligation to protect the welfare of disabled citizens leads the dissent to conclude that the courts must be involved in every decision to terminate life support.
I would observe that the Commonwealth’s parens patriae power can be exercised through bodies other than the courts and legal system. In the present case, the Commonwealth’s interests in protecting its disabled citizens and preserving life are amply discharged by the majority’s requirement that two doctors participate in every termination decision. To be licensed to practice medicine in this Commonwealth, doctors must undergo extensive training in medical ethics. This training is far more specialized than anything we members of the bench and bar receive in our formal education. When the only parties to a termination decision are the surrogate decision maker and the Commonwealth as parens patriae of the disabled subject, two duly licensed doctors are perfectly capable of representing the Commonwealth’s interests. The majority rightly observes that in this narrow situation, the court system is likely to contribute nothing except delay, expense and intrusion.
*640 Judge Popovich begins his dissent by noting that courts are a reservoir of wisdom on life and death decisions. The same is true of the medical profession, which specializes in the instant subject matter. We members of the bench and bar ought to keep in mind that we are not the only licensed professionals in this Commonwealth trained in and capable of making difficult ethical decisions.