stating that there was “no authority for appellant’s assumption that a challenge to the weight of the evidence may properly be entertained on appeal from parole revocation by the trial court”
How later courts described this case
- stating that there was “no authority for appellant’s assumption that a challenge to the weight of the evidence may properly be entertained on appeal from parole revocation by the trial court”
- stating that there was “no authority for appellant’s assumption that a challenge to the evidence may be properly entertained on appeal from parole revocation”
- concluding, in the analogous context of parole revocation proceedings, that a weight claim may not properly be raised on appeal
- stating court of common pleas retains authority to grant and revoke parole when offender is sentenced to maximum term of imprisonment of less than two years
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
POPOVICH, Judge,
concurring:
Albeit I concur in the result reached by the Majority, I would prefer that the adjudication (resolution) of the matter at hand be reserved to the expertise of the Commonwealth Court. See, e.g., 61 P.S. § 331.17.
We serve neither the ends of justice nor the preservation of the exclusivity reserved to the Commonwealth Court by our Legislature in reviewing issues best left to such a tribunal. By doing otherwise, we expose the appellate process to potentially divergent views emanating from the two intermediate appellate courts — Superior and Commonwealth Courts.
All cases should not be resolved in the name of “expeditious” justice, for in its wake we render the appellate process vulnerable as a patchwork of decision making that, *645 although rendering decisions, does little to preserve the authoritative scope of each tribunal.
In our zeal to decide cases, we should be cautious to assure ourselves of their origin and our source of jurisdiction to decide each. Better to eschew review of a case, and defer deciding the same by transferring the case to the appropriate tribunal, then deciding the dispute in the name of judicious dispute-resolution.
From the tenor of my concurrence, it is obvious that I disdain the expansion of the Superior Court’s jurisdiction, unnecessarily, when to do so is by judicial fiat vis-a-vis statutory guidelines which light our way as to what is jurisdictionally acceptable and what is not. I pray that we do not lose sight of this in an endeavor to decide cases.
Further, I concur in the Majority’s determination that the court below exercised appropriate discretion in denying the appellant his release on bail pending the resolution of his appeal. However, I do not find it appropriate at this time to itemize under what circumstances, if any, a parolee violator should be allowed his freedom (by means of bail) pending the resolution of an alleged parole violation and subsequent withdrawal of parole and an appeal therefrom.
I do not foreclose the existence of “exceptional circumstances” which would warrant the awarding of one’s release on bail pending his pursuit of the appellate process to vindicate himself/herself, provided, of course, the interests of justice would so require. See Commonwealth v. Bonaparte, 366 Pa.Super. 182 , 530 A.2d 1351 (1987). The facts at bar do not exhibit any such “exceptional circumstances”, thus, I concur in the Majority’s determination to affirm the actions of the court below.