stating that the result in DiProspero is dictated by "the plain language of [the 1998 Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act], language that does not admit of an ambiguity and that does not require that the statutorily enumerated serious injuries for which recovery is available also must satisfy an unstated ... requirement"
How later courts described this case
- stating that the result in DiProspero is dictated by "the plain language of [the 1998 Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act], language that does not admit of an ambiguity and that does not require that the statutorily enumerated serious injuries for which recovery is available also must satisfy an unstated ... requirement"
- holding that the Legislature adopted the "objective medical evidence" standard applied to the prior no-fault insurance law under Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290 (1992), by requiring "objective clinical evidence" in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8(a)
- explaining it is not the function of 9 A-0072-14T2 courts "to 'rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature []or presume that the Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain language'"
- finding the limitation-on- dismissal of those claims, we refer to only Ayotolani as plaintiff. When we use the parties' first names, we do so for ease of reading given the parties' common last names. We mean no disrespect. A-3641-20 3 lawsuit threshold bars a recovery for pain and suffering unless the plaintiff suffers an injury resulting in one of the six categories enumerated in the statut e
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
concurring in the result.
I concur in the judgment of this Court that the 1998 Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA), N.J.S.A 39:6A-1 to -35, does not contain the “serious life impact” requirement engrafted on its predecessor statute by Oswin v. Shaw, 129 N.J. 290 , 609 A.2d 415 (1992). Although principled arguments can be marshaled to support the proposition that AICRA implicitly incorporates Oswin’s serious life impact requirement — as the Court does in Part V of its opinion, ante, 183 N.J. 496 -506, 874 A.2d at 1050- *507 57, as the Appellate Division did here, in James v. Torres, 354 N.J.Super. 586 , 808 A.2d 873 (App.Div.2002), certif. denied, 175 N.J. 547 , 816 A.2d 1049 (2003), and in Rios v. Szivos, 354 N.J.Super. 578 , 808 A.2d 868 (App.Div.2002), and with which I would prefer to agree — those arguments do not overcome the plain language of AICRA, language that does not admit of an ambiguity and that does not require that its statutorily enumerated serious injuries for which recovery is available also must satisfy an unstated but previously mandated serious life impact requirement.
In the final analysis, Judge Weissbard, in dissent below, succinctly summarized the core issue when he observed that “[i]f the Legislature failed to effectuate its true intent (whatever that may be), it is for the Legislature, not us, to correct the situation.” If the Legislature intended that AICRA include Oswin’s serious life impact requirement as a predicate to recovery, then the cure is straightforward: it can amend N.J.S.A. 39:6A:8 to include that requirement. On the other hand, if the Legislature did not intend to transplant the serious life impact requirement of Oswin into AICRA, our decision today implements that legislative mandate. In either event, the issue now lies where it properly belongs: before the Legislature.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LONG, ZAZZALI, ALBIN, WALLACE and RIVERA-SOTO — 6.
Opposed — None.