Opinion

Commonwealth v. Cruse

  • 236 Pa. Super. 85
  • 344 A.2d 532
  • 1975 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1674
Court
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Sep 22, 1975
Status
Published
Author
Jacobs
On the bench
Watkins, Jacobs, Hoffman, Cercone, Price, Van Voort Spaeth
Cited by
14 cases
Authority
More cited than 8.7%

further investigation and corroboration needed

How later courts described this case

  • further investigation and corroboration needed
  • informant’s tip lacked indicia of reliability, only described defendant and auto, not any criminal activity
  • anonymous tip with no corroboration not reasonable suspicion to search vehicle

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Dissenting Opinion by

Jacobs, J.:

I respectfully dissent.

I continue to adhere to the premise that effective law enforcement requires that police be permitted to make brief investigatory stops based upon less than probable cause; and that our respect for the rights of individuals will not be tarnished by permitting such action. In this case police officers were in possession of information which clearly did not amount to probable cause sufficient to justify an arrest. The information was, however, sufficiently detailed to give rise to a suspicion on the part of the officers that criminal activity might be occurring or impending. Harboring such suspicions, the police officers *92 were justified in approaching the vehicle to investigate. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 228 Pa. Superior Ct. 158 , 328 A.2d 104 (1974); Commonwealth v. Smith, 225 Pa. Superior Ct. 509 , 311 A.2d 716 (1973). When the occupant of the vehicle made a furtive gesture inconsistent with the officer’s request, I believe the officer acted reasonably in extricating the appellant from the vehicle. Cf. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).

The law of search and seizure requires a balancing of the interests of the individual with those of society. Our legitimate concern for individual rights should not be permitted to obscure its counterweight — the interests of society — here manifested in the safety and lives of the police officer on the street. When an officer has a reasonable suspicion that a citizen is armed (and therefore inherently dangerous) and is confronted by a furtive gesture, I believe the officer must be permitted to act reasonably to protect himself.

In my opinion the currency of individual rights is not depreciated by brief investigatory stops based upon “specific and articulable facts,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), which give rise to reasonable suspicions that criminal activity is afoot. I would hold that the initial approach of the vehicle was lawful and that the furtive gesture by the appellant coupled with the officer’s suspicions that the occupants were armed provided justification for retrieving the weapon.

Watkins, P.J., and Van der Voort, J., join in this dissenting opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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