holding that certain sections of the Liquor Code did not require a mens rea when the legislature included terms such as “knowingly” and “willfully” in some provisions, but not in others
How later courts described this case
- holding that certain sections of the Liquor Code did not require a mens rea when the legislature included terms such as “knowingly” and “willfully” in some provisions, but not in others
- holding that imprisonment for vicarious liability crime violated due process under Pennsylvania Constitution
- developing that whether a culpable mental state is a necessary ingredient of a statutory offense is a matter of statutory interpretation
- application of absolute vicarious liability for acts of another in criminal case resulting in imprisonment deprives criminal defendant of due process of law; “[D]istinction between respondeat superior in tort law and its application to the criminal law is obvious[: i]n tort law, the doctrine is employed for the purpose of settling the incidence of loss upon the party who can best bear such loss[; but, w]e impose penal treatment upon those who injure or menace social interests, partly in order to reform, partly to prevent the continuation of the antisocial activity and partly to deter others.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice McBride:
I would agree that a man who sells liquor to a minor may be punished even if he did not know that the person to whom he sold was a minor. But in my opinion, the statute does not and cannot validly create an indictable misdemeanor under which a liquor licensee is *596 punished' by a fine or imprisonment, or both, for the act of an employee in selling to a minor, where, as here, the act itself is done without the licensee’s knowledge, consent, or acquiescence. -1 would reverse the judgment and discharge the defendant.