concluding that, once disciplinary jurisdiction attaches in this Court, the matter is not rendered moot by the judge's subsequent failed quest for retention
How later courts described this case
- concluding that, once disciplinary jurisdiction attaches in this Court, the matter is not rendered moot by the judge's subsequent failed quest for retention
- judge removed from office although he "claim[ed] he [would] not seek another term."
- “Once instituted, our jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings is thus only at an end when we issue a final order.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NIX, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion. I am constrained to write to respond to some of the questions raised in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Papadakos.
Under the scheme of Article V, Section 18 of our Constitution, a recommendation of removal by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board (“Board”) requires this Court’s action before it has efficacy. In the interim between Board action and this Court’s pronouncement, death, resignation or, as in this case, defeat in a retention effort might intervene. Thus the question arises whether the issue is mooted by one of these events. If this Court accepts a recommendation of removal, the effective date is obviously as of the date of the decision of this Court. The Board’s power is limited to *154 recommending the sanction it deems appropriate. The final action under Article V, Section 18 is committed to the Court and not the Board for discipline under this Section of our Constitution. This is consistent with the Article’s clear mandate to repose in this Court the ultimate responsibility for the management and discipline of the members of the unified judiciary within this Commonwealth. 1 There is no question that the Order entered today speaks from this date.
The real concern raised by the mootness issue is whether any purpose is served by a continuation and completion of the disciplinary process after the jurist in question has left office. As stated by the majority opinion and conceded by the dissent, the jurisdiction of the Court over the disciplinary processes under Article V, Section 18 is not affected by termination of the judicial service during the course of these proceedings. The issue is therefore a question of whether any purpose is to be served by continuing the proceedings to their conclusion. Where the event terminating the jurist’s service is death, there is arguably no purpose served by an ultimate finding by this Court. 2 However, where the termination results either from the completion of the term of office, an unsuccessful bid for retention, or a voluntary retirement the question of the former jurist’s right to again seek judicial office in this Commonwealth remains unanswered. See Article V, Section 18(i). It is for this reason that the majority in this matter properly concluded that the issue was not mooted by the unsuccessful retention bid. 3
*155 The concern of the dissent that this process will cast a cloud upon all of the decisions of the affected judicial officer from the date of the filing of the Board’s recommendation is without substance. If that reasoning is followed it could be argued that the decisions rendered by the jurist during the proceedings before the Board would also be suspect. Recognizing the resourcefulness of counsel of this bar, I realize that if we accept that premise it could be cogently argued that from the period Judge Snyder’s conduct came into question all of his decisions could be questioned. This is inevitable, but not catastrophic. In each instance an error must be demonstrated before relief would be warranted and such would be the case in any event.
FLAHERTY, J., joins this opinion.
. Article V, Section 18(n) leaves impeachment as an alternative vehicle for the removal of a judicial officer.
. The issue of the entitlement of the jurist’s estate to retirement benefits, in the event of an intervening death, may require a conclusion of the disciplinary process.
. It must be noted that the failure to be retained does not terminate the service of the jurist, since he or she is allowed to complete the initial term of office. The effect of a retention defeat only precludes the jurist from serving an additional term without a subsequent election or appointment.