The opinion
Barnes, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with substantially all of the majority opinion and with the principles of law and supporting authorities cited in *97 it. Indeed, I only dissent in the conclusion reached by the majority in the last three paragraphs of its opinion and in that portion of the mandate which remands the case for further proceedings before the Public Service Commission.
In my opinion, the majority in its construction of subsection (b) has departed from the principles of statutory construction so ably and carefully articulated in its opinion by, in effect, adding words to that subsection which are not in it, i.e., by striking out the period and adding at the end of the subsection the words “and in which it did actually provide service.” As I see it, however, the language of subsection (b) is not ambiguous, so that there is no need for using the principles of statutory construction applicable in the event of ambiguity in the statutory language.
Judge Sybert, for the Court, stated in Germenko v. Public Service Commission, 226 Md. 295, 301-02 , 173 A. 2d 362, 365-66 (1961) — cited in the majority opinion — involving a “grandfather” clause relating to contract carriers of flammable liquids in bulk:
“The cardinal rule in the construction of statutes is to give effect to the intention of the legislature, and in determining that intention the Court considers the language of an enactment in its natural and ordinary signification, and, if there is no ambiguity on the face of it, there is no need for construction and the Court will give to the language used its apparent meaning.”
Judge Sybert further aptly stated:
“We might add that the interpretation contended for by appellants would require reading into the 1959 statute some such limiting words as ‘carriers operating under permit’. However, courts are ‘generally not at liberty to surmise a legislative intent contrary to the letter of the statute, or to indulge in the license of inserting or omitting words with the view of making the statute express an intent which is not evidenced in the original form’. Tax Comm. v. Power Company, 182 Md. 111, 116 , 32 A. 2d 382 (1943).”
*98 In subsection (b), the words “engaged in the operation” are followed by the words “of any radio common carrier system licensed by the Federal Communications Commission on July 1, 1971.” There is no limitation on how the system is operated nor any provision in regard to the extent of its operation. There is no question whatever that RCI was “engaged in the operation” of a “radio common carrier system” and was “licensed by the Federal Communications Commission on July 1, 1971.” It is qualified as a public service company, so that by the plain, clear and unambiguous language of subsection (b), it “s/ia££”(emphasis added) receive a certificate of convenience and necessity from the PSC authorizing the company “to continue the operation” (emphasis added) of the carrier in the territory “professed to be served by that company on July 1, 1971. . . .” The plain and ordinary meaning of the key word “professed” is “openly declared, avowed, acknowledged, or claimed,” Webster’s New International Dictionary 1975 (2d ed. 1944), and see Black’s Law Dictionary 1375 (4th ed. 1951), defining “profess” as “[t]o make open declaration of, to make public declaration or avowal.” See also 34 Words and Phrases, “Profess; Professedly,” at 378-79. The words “by that company” following the words “professed to be served” clearly indicate to me that the profession is to be made by the applying company and there is no contention that RCI did not profess to serve the subdivisions mentioned by it in its grandfather application. “[P]rofessed to be served” does not mean that the company must show, as a condition precedent to obtaining the certificate, that it provided “satisfactory” or “reasonably adequate” service in the areas listed by it in its application. Doubtlessly, if the General Assembly had so intended, it would have used appropriate language to that effect as indeed, in effect, it did ixi subsection '(d) of Section 55A of Art. 78. As Germenko • plainly teaches, we are not permitted to supply any additional words to the statute.
The language in subsection (b) in regard to the issuance of the certificate by PSC is mandatory — “shall” — and not permissive or discretionary. See 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 85(2), at 474 (1969) where it is stated:
*99 “Unlike the granting of a certificate of public convenience and necessity in the ordinary case, as considered infra § 86, where applicant seeks a certificate as an existing carrier and complies with the requirements of the statute, the commission has no discretion to deny the certificate, but its powers and duties are ministerial and mandatory.”
If RCI, after receiving its grandfather certificate of convenience and necessity, is unable to supply service which is adequate “to meet the reasonable needs of the public” in the areas it professes to serve, then appropriate proceedings by those aggrieved may be instituted under subsection (d) or under other appropriate provisions of Art. 78. It strikes me that this is a far wiser method of procedure than the one pursued by the PSC in this case and the one which it apparently will pursue as a result of the decision and remand by the majority. In the method of procedure which the statute envisions, as I believe the statute should be construed, the specific issues of the reasonable needs of the public in the particular area involved and the quality of the service may be explored in a specific area with definite persons aggrieved rather than in a most general proceeding employing a “shotgun” approach — a single trapeze act rather than a three-ring circus.
The difference is substantial and not merely a question of semantics. If it is required that questions of the quality of service and the reasonable needs of the public be considered in a post-grandfather certificate proceeding, the persons complaining of inadequate service will have the burden of coming forward with the pleadings and proof rather than the grandfather carrier. However, this burden, I fear, will come upon RCI as a result of the remand. To me, it is most incongruous that the grandfather carrier, by applying for a certificate under subsection (b), has immediately precipitated hearings and litigation as a condition precedent to receiving its certificate.
There is nothing unusual or unjust in a provision which gives a person or company operating first in a given field the advantage of his first position. Indeed, one of the principal *100 maxims of equity is qui prior est tempore potior est jure — he who is prior in time has priority in right. See May v. Buckhannon River Lumber Co., 70 Md. 448, 450 , 17 A. 274, 275 (1889) where Judge Yellott, speaking for the Court, after referring to the maxim, stated:
“This maxim, though perhaps as old as our system of jurisprudence, is just as applicable now as when first promulgated by the English courts.”
See Co. Litt. 14(a).
This incongruity is compounded, as it were, in view of the prior decisions of the Court in Baltimore Tank Lines v. Public Service Commission, 215 Md. 125 , 137 A. 2d 187 (1957) and in Germenko, supra, which followed the decision in Baltimore Tank Lines . In short, the procedure which I think the General Assembly established in the legislation under consideration in the present case is quite analogous to procedures previously adopted by the General Assembly in prior legislation relating to grandfather situations. Our prior decisions and the clear meaning of subsection (b) are, like the old-time religion, good enough for me.
I would reverse, but I would not remand the case for further proceedings.
I am authorized to state that Judge Digges concurs in the views expressed in this dissent.