stating that “[e]vidence will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the defendant. This Court has stated that it is not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at hand and form part of the history and natural development of the events and offenses for which the defendant is charged.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[e]vidence will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the defendant. This Court has stated that it is not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at hand and form part of the history and natural development of the events and offenses for which the defendant is charged.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)
- stating that “[e]vidence will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the defendant. [A court] is not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration where those facts -8- J-S71021-19 are relevant to the issues at hand and form part of the history and natural development of the events and offenses for which the defendant is charged.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)
- finding evidence of appellant’s prior abuse of the minor sexual assault victim’s family members was properly admitted because the evidence was probative of the reasons for victim’s delay in reporting the sexual assaults and “was also relevant for res gestae purposes, i.e., to explain the events surrounding the sexual assaults, and resulting prosecution so that the case presented to the jury did not appear in a vacuum”
- stating that “an abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Chief Justice CAPPY
concurring.
I join the majority in its entirety. I write to emphasize that while our holding allows the Commonwealth to introduce evidence in its case-in-chief to explain a lack of prompt complaint, this rule is limited to sexual assault cases. In this type of case the judiciary can rightly take note of the fact that the jury may make a natural inference against the credibility of a witness for a failure to report promptly consistent with the policy that underlies the legislation at 18 Pa.C.S. § 3105. Section 3105 instructs that a prompt complaint is not required for the prosecution of sexual offenses. This reflects the Legislature’s response to the common law assumption of “hue and cry” which presupposes that a victim of sexual assault will immediately cry out, and if he or she does not, a negative inference can be drawn against the credibility of the complaint and against whether or not the incident in fact occurred. *369 Commonwealth v. Snoke, 525 Pa. 295 , 580 A.2d 295, 300 (1990) (quoting the anachronistic adage “hue and cry follow rape like smoke follows fire”).