holding that, because the plaintiffs allegation was that the rotor system was defective because it did not allow enough time for the average pilot to go into autorotation, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiffs failure to go into autorotation within the necessary time constituted an “abnormal use” of the system
How later courts described this case
- holding that, because the plaintiffs allegation was that the rotor system was defective because it did not allow enough time for the average pilot to go into autorotation, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiffs failure to go into autorotation within the necessary time constituted an “abnormal use” of the system
- holding that, for policy reasons, a manufacturer should be the guarantor of its products' safety, reasoning that the distinction between strict liability and negligence is that the exercise of due care in strict liability cases is absolutely irrelevant
- holding trial court erred in instructing on manufacturer's foreseeability, as "[t]o require foreseeability is to require the manufacturer to use due care in preparing his product. In strict liability, the manufacturer is liable even if he has exercised all due care."
- plaintiff cannot be precluded from recovery in a strict liability case due to his own negligence
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc., 618 Pa. 228 (2012)
337 A.2d 893, 898 (Pa. 1975), overruled on other grounds by Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc., 55 A.3d 1088
Distinguished
Distinguished by Mazur v. Merck & Co., 964 F.2d 1348 (1992)
Berkebile is first, and foremost, a section 402A case, and is inapposite here.
The opinion
POMEROY, Justice
(concurring).
It is by now settled that a product which is perfectly made may nonetheless be “unreasonably dangerous” if adequate warnings of the dangers involved in the use of the product are required and are not given by the seller. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, comment h; Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 287 , 282 A.2d 206, 209 (1971). See also Patch v. Stanley Works (Stanley Chemical Co. Div.), 448 F.2d 483 (2nd Cir. 1971); Prosser on Torts, 659 (4th Ed., 1971; 63 Am.Jur.2d, Products Liability, § 42 at 53. I concur in the decision of the Court affirming the grant of a new trial because I am satisfied that the trial judge in his charge did not suffi *105 ciently inform the jury of the need for adequate warnings, as to how the jury should determine adequacy and the consequences of inadequacy.
While the portion of the charge dealing with this subject was in general correct as far as it went, it failed to apprise the jury that where a product contains inherent dangers to human life there is a mandatory duty on the seller of the product to give warnings to the user or consumer which are adequate to inform him of such dangers, and that when such a product is sold without adequate warnings, the product is sold in a “defective condition” within the meaning of the law on strict liability. 1 As the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Jones suggests, the issue should have been put squarely to the jury whether the various warnings and directions which were in fact given by the defendant to plaintiff’s decedent, but which did not include any reference to the extremely brief time available to place the helicopter in autorotation while in climbing flight, were adequate under the circumstances. 2 Stated another way, a principal issue for jury determination was whether under all the evidence the warnings “adequately conveyed [to the user] the urgency of the situation and the need to react almost instantaneously.” (Opinion announcing the decision of the court, ante at 902.)
The deficiency of the charge in this regard was, in my view, sufficiently serious to require a new trial.
. A charge substantially to this effect was requested by appellee but refused by the trial court.
. Defendant introduced expert testimony to the effect that a precise statement of time within which to achieve autorotation could not be given because the time required depended on a number of variables, such as weight of the aircraft (which is in turn related to the amount of fuel on board), the power setting and the pitch of the blades when the power failed, the angle of ascent and the reaction time of an “average” pilot.