holding in case in which Cell-mark laboratory refused to produce information regarding methodology and its database that DNA typing evidence and statistical probabilities were inadmissible and limiting use of population frequency statistics because “juries in criminal cases may give undue weight and deference to presented statistical evidence”
How later courts described this case
- holding in case in which Cell-mark laboratory refused to produce information regarding methodology and its database that DNA typing evidence and statistical probabilities were inadmissible and limiting use of population frequency statistics because “juries in criminal cases may give undue weight and deference to presented statistical evidence”
- holding that because forensic samples are often so small that the entire sample must be used to procure a reliable result, access to the data, methodology, and actual results of the state's DNA tests is crucial for the defendant to have at least an opportunity for independent expert review
- holding that, because a DNA laboratory failed to make information about its methodology and probes publicly available, this prevented independent assessment of its methods, supporting a determination that specific test results were inadmissible
- limiting the use of population frequency statistics because "there is a real danger that the jury will use the evidence as a measure of the probability of the defendant's guilt or innocence and that the evidence will thereby undermine the presumption of innocence, erode the values served by the reasonable doubt standard, and dehumanize our system of justice"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KELLEY, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in Part I and II of the majority opinion. I likewise concur in Part III, but with considerable reluctance. I feel constrained to do so by the doctrine of stare decisis, or precedent, upon which our common law is based but, nonetheless, take this opportunity to once again urge my colleagues to re-examine the authority upon which this case is premised.
Part III of the opinion is premised on the majority holding in State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544 (Minn.1987). That holding prohibited the use of population frequency statistics in criminal cases. So far as I have been able to ascertain, among the jurisdictions which have addressed the issue, Minnesota stands alone in depriving the jury of this relevant and probative evidence. In my opinion, it occupies that solitary position for reasons I find unpersuasive. See State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d at 551-553 (Kelley, J., dissenting).
The majority decision in State v. Joon Kyu Kim is of recent vintage. Therefore, absent the existence of other reasons not therein considered by the court, admittedly it should not be lightly discarded. However, the fact that 19 state appellate courts and three federal appellate courts have declined to utilize the State v. Joon Kyu Kim limitation on the use of scientific population frequency statistics in criminal cases, combined with the fact that the 1989 legislature provided in section 299C.155 (Supp. 1989) 1 that such evidence should be admissible in criminal cases, I postulate that a re-examination of our ruling in State v. Joon Kyu Kim would be neither inappropriate nor unduly precipitant.
. Apparently the law was a reaction, at least in part, to the State v. Joon Kyu Kim holding. See dialogue between Assistant Attorney General William Klumpp, representing the Minnesota Attorney General’s office, and Representative Randy Kelly in the House Judiciary Committee, Criminal Justice Subcommittee Hearing on the Omnibus Criminal Control Bill (Section then designated H.F. 315) (March 1, 1989).