stating the duty to warn A-2414-18T4 15 under N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 in the context of a snowstorm "concerns only extraordinary conditions that are qualitatively different from those conditions that would be 'reasonably apparent to' or 'anticipated by' a careful motorist driving in a snowstorm," such as a stalled snowplow in traffic or the creation of an artificial snowbank making a highway impassable
How later courts described this case
- stating the duty to warn A-2414-18T4 15 under N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 in the context of a snowstorm "concerns only extraordinary conditions that are qualitatively different from those conditions that would be 'reasonably apparent to' or 'anticipated by' a careful motorist driving in a snowstorm," such as a stalled snowplow in traffic or the creation of an artificial snowbank making a highway impassable
- holding that common law immunity for snow removal survived TCA; noting that that immunity developed "[i]n the midst of [a] gradual erosion of judicial tolerance for the doctrine of sovereign immunity" but was reflective of "the unique challenge snow removal poses for public entities" and that conditions supporting that immunity remained prevalent
- holding that there may be an exception to the common law immunity where the conduct of the public entity was “unrelated to snow-removal activity” and amounted to “palpably unreasonable failure to warn of a dangerous condition”
- considering whether common law immunity for snow removal survived TCA adoption and concluding that “[a]bsent a clear and specific indication that the Legislature intended to impose a liability that could have such a radical impact on the fiscal affairs of public entities,” TCA did not establish clear enough legislative expression to have abrogated that protective immunity
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLIFFORD, Justice,
dissenting in part.
Part III of the majority opinion, with its grant of leave to plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, loses me. It is nothing *431 short of a rescue job, a heroic effort to salvage plaintiffs’ case by allowing them to start all ovér again, by way of amended complaint, a case now four years old arising out of a February 1983 occurrence. The resort to N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 is nothing less than an invention of the Court. That section of the Tort Claims Act is nowhere adverted to at any stage of the proceedings— not at trial, not in the Appellate Division, not in this Court. The briefs may be searched in vain for any citation to that statute.
The Court therefore lends its authority to making an entirely new case for plaintiffs. That may be good for them but it is manifestly unfair to defendant Department of Transportation, to say nothing of the trial judge. I do not perceive my obligation to see that justice is done as constituting a roving commission to inject whenever needed a transfusion of life-giving serum into an expired case.
For the reasons stated in Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion I would reverse and remand to the Law Division for reinstatement of the judgment in favor of defendant Department of Transportation.
Justices POLLOCK and GARIBALDI join in this opinion.
For affirmance as to part II —Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justice HANDLER—2.
For reversal as to part II—Justices CLIFFORD, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN—5.
For remand and amending complaint as to part III —Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices HANDLER, O’HEARN and STEIN—4.
For remand and reinstatement of judgment as to part III —Justices CLIFFORD, POLLOCK and GARIBALDI—3.