finding that the absence of a traditional doctor-patient relationship does not preclude imposing a duty on the examining doctor, the fulfillment of which may require informing the patient of abnormalities
How later courts described this case
- finding that the absence of a traditional doctor-patient relationship does not preclude imposing a duty on the examining doctor, the fulfillment of which may require informing the patient of abnormalities
- stating that “[a] professionally unrea sonable examination that is detrimental to the examinee is not immunized from liability because a third-party authorized or paid for the exam”
- holding that physician performing pre-employment physical examination has non-delegable duty to inform patient of potentially serious medical condition
- discussing Deramus v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 274 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1115, 117 S.Ct. 956, 136 L.Ed.2d 843 (1997); Daly, 946 F.2d 1467; and Betesh v. United States, 400 F.Supp. 238 (D.D.C.1974)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Sinclair v. Roth, 356 N.J. Super. 4 (2002)
" Defendant argues that Reed is distinguishable because here (1) the plaintiff was not referred by his employer, and (2) the plaintiff was under a doctor's care at all times, and was only referred to defendant for a stress test.
The opinion
VERNIERO, J.,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion. I interpret its holding as imposing a duty on the physician to examine the individual competently, within the parameters of the third-party referral, and to disclose to that examinee any potentially serious condition revealed by the examination. Although the Court cites approvingly to that portion of Ranier v. Frieman, 294 N.J.Super. 182, 190 , 682 A.2d 1220 (App.Div.1996), in which the Appellate Division articulated that the examining physician’s duty is “to make a professionally reasonable and competent diagnosis,” ante 166 N.J. at 105, 764 A.2d at 442, it does so strictly in the context of an examination requested by a third-party entity. I do not interpret the Court’s holding as imposing a duty on the examining physician to discover or diagnose potential ailments beyond the scope of the third-party referral.
The Court’s approach resembles the approach reflected in N.J.A.C. 13:35-6.5. That regulation provides that a licensee in Dr. Bojarski’s position must disclose to examinees any “abnormalities or conditions” revealed by the examination and not known to them. N.J.A.C. 13:35 — 6.5(f). In my view, that provision establishes a non-delegable duty on the part of physicians to disclose such information to persons, like Mr. Reed, who are examined at the request of employers or other third-party entities. Persons examined by physicians in those circumstances have a right to be informed of any negative results.
*111 Moreover, N.J.A.C. 13:35-6.5(f) is careful to denote persons who are examined in the employment-screening context as “examinees” as opposed to “patients.” The regulation defines an examinee as a “person who is the subject of professional examination where the purpose of that examination is unrelated to treatment and where a report of the examination is to be supplied to a third party.” N.J.A.C. 13:35-6.5(a). A patient, on the other hand, is defined as “any person who is the recipient of a professional service ... for purposes of treatment or a consultation relating to treatment.” Ibid. The regulation thus contemplates a circumscribed relationship between the examining physician and examinee in the employment-screening context.
For reversal arid, remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI — 7.
Opposed — None.