The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Barry:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case.
While I must agree with the proposition that remand orders are generally interlocutory and therefore should in the interest of good administration be unappealable I cannot agree with the majority’s position that all remand orders from the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board must be considered unappealable as a matter of course.
One of the entrenched tenets of The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act is that it is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed to effectuate its humanitarian objectives. Krawchuk v. Philadelphia Electric Company, 497 Pa. 115 , 439 A.2d 627 (1981). In my view, these objectives are. not observed where a claimant who has been awarded benefits must wait to receive those benefits pending a remand for a determination of attorney fees and possible appeals to the Board and an appellate court or courts. In short, where liability has been finally determined by the Board and it has entered a remand order, on an issue not involving liability, I would favor a procedure where liability decid *532 ed, the .remaining auxiliary issue could then be addressed. The analogy to trespass cases is appropriate. Liability can be determined in such cases and damages later addressed.
Accordingly, I would permit this appeal and address the merits, which in my judgment involves a final order.
Judge Doyle joins in this dissent.