explaining that an error may be considered harmless where the error did not prejudice the defendant, or any prejudice was de minimis; the erroneously admitted evidence was cumulative of properly admitted evidence; or the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilty was so overwhelming that the error could not have contributed to the verdict
How later courts described this case
- explaining that an error may be considered harmless where the error did not prejudice the defendant, or any prejudice was de minimis; the erroneously admitted evidence was cumulative of properly admitted evidence; or the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilty was so overwhelming that the error could not have contributed to the verdict
- holding that death-qualifying the jury is a proper and necessary procedure to ensure a fair trial and does not deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial jury from a representative cross-section of the community or result in a jury inclined to impose death in capital [J-2-2015] - 41 murder prosecution
- holding that the process of asking questions during voir dire to identify individuals who object to the death penalty and who cannot impose the death penalty under any circumstances and excluding those jurors from the venire is a proper and necessary procedure to ensure a fair trial
- holding that the grave risk of death aggravating circumstance can be found where there is potential for an errant, ricochet, or pass-through bullet; it is unnecessary the endangered bystander be in the direct line of fire
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion, subject to the following reservations.
I have difficulty with the majority’s approach to the degree to which it approves of a prosecutor’s practice of discussing the perspective of uncalled, supportive witnesses. See Majority Opinion, at 327-29, 961 A.2d at 153-54. I would specifically disapprove such practice and would rest the disposition of this claim upon a finding of insufficient prejudice.
With regard to the treatment of Appellant’s claim deriving from his argument that criminal trespass does not qualify to support the in-perpetration-of-a-felony aggravator, see Majority Opinion at 333-34, 961 A.2d at 156-57, I note that Appellant’s argument recently was rejected by a majority of this Court in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 583 Pa. 358, 379-81 , 877 A.2d 433, 445-46 (2005). I regard Robinson as governing precedent, albeit I held a contrary view. See id. at 392-99 , 877 A.2d at 453-58 (Saylor, J., dissenting).