finding that encounter was an investigatory detention where the appellant was not told that he was free to leave after his documents were returned, and the trooper inquired about his travels
How later courts described this case
- finding that encounter was an investigatory detention where the appellant was not told that he was free to leave after his documents were returned, and the trooper inquired about his travels
- holding totality of factors supported finding that consent to search was voluntary and not the product of coercion, even if officer failed to inform subject that he could refuse consent
- stating that “when a person is standing outside rather than inside his vehicle, he is less likely to believe that he can actually leave the area by entering the car and driving away.”
- following valid investigatory stop, defendant voluntarily consented to search of vehicle, even though investigating officer did not inform defendant that he could refuse to consent to search; there was no excessive police conduct, no physical contact occurred between police and defendant, officer did not display his weapon, officer’s order to defendant’s companion to exit car was necessitated by fact that companion was not licensed driver and had to move out of driver’s seat, defendant did not lack maturity or sophistication and was not intellectually incapable of exercising free will, and character of initial investigative detention, the traffic stop, was routine
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CONCURRING STATEMENT BY
ORIE MELVIN, J.:
¶ 1 While I agree with the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s refusal to suppress the evidence, I write separately to clarify that I do so on the basis that I believe the latter portion of the interaction between Appellant and Trooper DeLuca was a mere encounter and not an investigative detention. In all other respects, I agree with the majority’s cogent analysis.