Opinion

Jamieson v. Luce-Mackinac-Alger-Schoolcraft District Health Department

  • 198 Mich. App. 103
  • 497 N.W.2d 551
Court
Michigan Court of Appeals
Filed
Feb 1, 1993
Status
Published
Author
McDonald
On the bench
Griffin, Weaver, McDonald
Cited by
5 cases
Authority
More cited than 8.6%

The opinion

McDonald, J.

(dissenting). I would reverse the grant of summary disposition in favor of the individual defendants J. Terrian, M.D., and Rose Hendrickson, R.N., and hold there is a question of fact whether those defendants are guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct.

I agree with the majority’s position that to assert a valid claim against those defendants, plaintiff must show wilful and wanton misconduct *115 and that "wilful and wanton misconduct” is properly defined as "such indifference to whether harm will result as to be the equivalent of a willingness that it does.” Burnett v City of Adrian, 414 Mich 448, 455 ; 326 NW2d 810 (1982).

Count ii of plaintiff’s complaint alleges, in part, that defendant Terrian failed to:

(c) Pay any heed whatsoever to the radiology report where it was suggested that the plaintiffs decedent suffered from a rounded density in the left mid lung with central lucency with the radiologist’s advice that further follow-up evaluation was necessary.

(e) Inform the plaintiffs decedent that immediate medical follow-up and attention was required as a result of an interpretation given an x-ray taken 9/23/87.

4. The conduct referred to in the preceding paragraph is conduct that is so reckless that it demonstrates a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury resulted to the plaintiffs decedent.

Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, I believe plaintiff’s allegations pleaded a cause of action for "wilful and wanton misconduct” sufficient to avoid dismissal under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8).

I also believe plaintiff presented sufficient factual support to withstand a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(0(10). Defendant Terrian contends no physician-patient relationship existed with plaintiff. Throughout his deposition, both he and his attorney insisted on referring to the decedent as a "client” and himself as a "service provider.” Yet, Terrian admits he was the only person in the health department with the authority to determine the decedent’s treatment. *116 Only he could order x-rays or prescribe medication for a person in the decedent’s situation. There being sufficient evidence indicating a physician-patient relationship, I would find the trial court’s finding to the contrary clearly erroneous.

This case is not about misreading an x-ray report. No one disagrees with Terrian’s conclusion that the x-ray report was negative for tuberculosis. Instead, the crux of this suit is whether he intentionally failed to share with the decedent the x-ray report’s finding of a left mid lung rounded density with a central lucency and its recommendation for a medical follow-up. In his deposition, Terrian claimed any duty he owed to the decedent was confined to a determination whether the x-ray was positive or negative for tuberculosis. He concedes the density found by the radiologist had medical significance and could indicate cancer of the lung. He acknowledges he read the portions of the x-ray report that indicated the presence of the mass and recommended further follow-up, but he did not believe the law obligated him to disclose the information to the decedent. He was uncertain whether he had a professional obligation to disclose the information. His deposition testimony further indicated his belief that a doctor does not necessarily do service to a person by informing of the presence of cancer, because the information merely results in the prolonging of treatment.

Thus, the evidence indicates he knew the report contained medically significant information about the decedent’s health and that he purposely chose not to reveal this information to her. There is also evidence indicating that if he had disclosed the information, the decedent’s lung cancer may have been discovered two years earlier. In my opinion this is more than sufficient evidence to enable a jury to find that defendant Terrian’s conduct *117 amounted to "such indifference to whether harm will result as to be the equivalent of a willingness that it does.”

I would apply the same analysis to defendant Hendrickson. Hendrickson admitted she worked under the direction of defendant Terrian and administered prescription medication to the decedent. Further, she concedes the radiologist’s finding of the density in the left lung and recommendation for further testing was medically significant. Hendrickson’s inability to recall whether she discussed the report with the decedent constitutes sufficient evidence for the question whether her conduct was "wilful and wanton misconduct” to go to the jury.

I would reverse the court’s order granting summary disposition to defendants Terrian and Hendrickson and order trial on counts n and in of plaintiff’s amended complaint.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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