holding that “the precise age of the victim, i.e., the fact that the victim was only seven- years-old at the time of the sexual abuse, was not an element of rape or IDSI of a victim less than thirteen years old and could justify an above-guideline sentence. … Additionally, [the defendant] has offered no legitimate basis to presume that individual factors of the case], are subsumed within the sentencing guidelines.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “the precise age of the victim, i.e., the fact that the victim was only seven- years-old at the time of the sexual abuse, was not an element of rape or IDSI of a victim less than thirteen years old and could justify an above-guideline sentence. … Additionally, [the defendant] has offered no legitimate basis to presume that individual factors of the case], are subsumed within the sentencing guidelines.”
- explaining that sentence may be vacated as "unreasonable" if "the sentence was imposed without express or implicit consideration by the sentencing court of the general standards applicable to sentencing found in Section 9721, i.e., the protection of the public; the gravity of the offense in relation to the impact on the victim and the community; and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant."
- stating that sentencing court could consider the precise age of the victim because it was not an element of rape and IDSI of a victim less than thirteen years of age and the court considered the victim’s specific age in conjunction with the grandparent/abuser’s breach of grandchild’s trust and his failure to take responsibility
- stating that “[a]n abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*576 Justice BAER,
concurring.
As I conclude that the Superior Court erred, I join the Majority. However, I write separately to express my concern regarding the Majority’s decision to “decline to fashion any concrete rules as to the unreasonableness inquiry for a sentence that falls outside of applicable guidelines.” Majority Op. at 568, 926 A.2d at 964. I fear that the decision will be interpreted to provide near limitless discretion for trial courts in the sentencing context. The Majority’s decision may indeed negate the intended effect of the guidelines, which, as the Majority acknowledges, “were designed to bring greater rationality and consistency to sentences and to eliminate unwarranted disparity in sentencing.” Majority Op. at 565 n. 3, 926 A.2d at 961-62 n. 3. While I fully agree that the sentencing guidelines are merely guidelines, rather than requirements, the General Assembly’s enactments nonetheless require trial courts to provide reasons in support of any deviation from the guidelines, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), and require appellate courts to vacate sentences deemed unreasonable, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781. These provisions require an appellate court to determine whether the reasons given by a trial court provide a reasonable rationale for deviating from the guidelines. An appellate court should vacate a sentence where the trial court provides no basis, or an unreasonable basis, for the deviation.
Accordingly, I join in the decision of the Majority to remand the matter to the Superior Court for reexamination of the judgment of sentence.