explaining that the “but for” prejudice test aligns with the post-conviction requirement of proving that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place, as both formulations derive from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the “but for” prejudice test aligns with the post-conviction requirement of proving that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place, as both formulations derive from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)
- stating that “ [reliability of the adjudication of guilt or innocence and the probability that counsel’s ineffectiveness caused a different outcome of the proceedings are concepts so closely intertwined and commonly-rooted in Strickland that we refuse to separate them”
- holding that Section 9543(a)(2)(h) does not place a more stringent standard for collateral review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel than the Sixth Amendment standard applicable to ineffectiveness claims raised on direct appeal
- holding that where there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different, the PCRA's "no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence" standard for relief is satisfied
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by Commonwealth v. Ginglardi, 2000 Pa. Super. 222 (2000)
We also disagree with the dissent's conclusion that Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326 (1999), had that effect.
The opinion
ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring:
I join in the majority opinion as I agree that the standard to evaluate counsel’s effectiveness on direct appeal should equally apply to ineffective counsel claims under the Post Conviction *320 Relief Act. Although I joined Justice Montemuro’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Buehl, 540 Pa. 493 , 658 A.2d 771 (1995), which held to the contrary, the protracted confusion in this area of the law convinces me that a separate standard for PCRA ineffectiveness claims is unworkable. Further, upon reflection, I am persuaded that the discrepancy in the language utilized in the PCRA and that espoused in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153 , 527 A.2d 973 (1987), amounts to a distinction without a difference. Accordingly, I conclude that the better approach is that taken by the majority opinion.