The opinion
Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the Appellate Division’s holding that is upheld today by an evenly divided Court. To the extent this Court concludes that insurance coverage is not excluded under the endangerment or harm exclusion of the insurance policy-providing that “[w]e do not cover bodily injury or property damage, whether or not expected or intended by the insured, which is a consequence of an insured’s willful harm or knowing endangerment” — I join in the thoughtful dissent of my colleague Justice Wallace.
There is yet another exclusion in the insurance policy that bars, in my view, the relief afforded. The insurance policy clearly and unambiguously provides that
[■w]e provide no insurance for any sort of damages, expenses, liability, or loss directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, aggravated by, consisting of, or resulting from the following — even if loss or an occurrence otherwise covered contributes to such concurrently or in any sequence.
GOVERNMENTAL AND LEGAL ACTION
*358 D. Knowing violation of penal law or ordinance committed by, or with the consent of, an insured, statutory fines, or exemplary or punitive damages, illegal transportation or trade.
The policy defines “occurrence” as “an accident (including exposure to conditions) which results, during the policy term, in bodily injury or property damage.” The policy also defines “insured” to include, among others, the named insured, the named insured’s spouse, and any relatives resident in the named insured’s household.
The senseless events of the late evening of January 20, 2001— during which the 14-year-old son of the named insured, intentionally and with the knowledge that he was engaging in an illegal act, took random potshots with a BB gun at a number of passing cars during a snow storm, the last shot piercing the soft top of the Jeep driven by the victim, rendering her blind in her right eye — are a textbook example of the very behavior excluded from coverage by this exemption. There was an event producing bodily injury (an “occurrence”) that resulted from the actions of a resident relative of the named insured (an “insured”) that constituted a knowing violation of the penal laws of this State. Therefore, on its face, the behavior for which insurance coverage is sought is clearly excluded.
The Court discards the insurance policy’s exclusion for acts that violate “penal law” because that exclusion, which does not define penal law, “can arguably be read as references only an adult’s violation of a criminal statute, and not conduct by a juvenile that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime” and “[e]ven if debatable, the penal law exclusion is ambiguous and must be interpreted in favor of coverage.” Ante, 183 N.J. at 352, 873 A.2d at 539. There is, however, no meaningful or principled distinction between the insurance policy’s exclusion for acts that knowingly violate the penal laws of this State and the actor’s status as a juvenile. Stated differently, in this setting, whether the actor is an adult or a juvenile is a distinction without a difference. Our Juvenile Code expressly defines “delinquency” as “the commission of an act by a juvenile which if committed by an adult would *359 constitute [either] [a] crime; [a] disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense; or [a] violation of any other penal statute, ordinance or regulation.” N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-23. The restrictions of the penal laws of this State apply to everyone regardless of age; how we as a society treat those violations based on the actor’s age goes not to the actor’s substantive liability for a violation of our penal laws, but to the quantum and manner of punishment to be imposed. On the more immediate question of whether insurance coverage is applicable or is excluded by this policy provision, the age of the insured is irrelevant. Given this analysis, any claim of ambiguity cannot be sustained.
The acts performed by the minor resulting in the injuries to the victim clearly violate the penal laws of this State: a BB gun is defined as a “firearm”, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-l(f), State v. Mieles, 199 N.J.Super. 29 , 488 A.2d 235 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 265 , 501 A.2d 933 (1985); State v. McCandless, 190 N.J.Super. 75 , 461 A.2d 1205 (App.Div.1983); and a factual setting where a minor knowingly discharges a firearm at a single moving vehicle, not to mention the several motor vehicles this minor shot at and hit before firing the shot that blinded the victim here, violates a number of our criminal laws. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1 (assault); N.J.S.A. 2C:58-6.1 (possession of firearms by minors); N.J.S.A. 2C:12-5 (unlawful possession of weapons). This conclusion is buttressed by the minor’s admissions that he took a number of potshots at moving vehicles with the intent of not only shooting at them, but also of actually hitting them; that, when he shot at them, he knew that these vehicles were occupied, at least by a driver and possibly some passengers; that he knew that what he was doing was wrong; that he knew that what he was doing was illegal; that he knew that if he were caught shooting his BB gun at passing vehicles he would be prosecuted; and that he anticipated that he would be questioned by the police after the incident.
If the policy exclusion that excludes coverage for acts which violate penal law does not apply in these circumstances, then it is needlessly denied its full meaning, a conclusion the Court, by its *360 evenly divided status, reaches and to which I cannot subscribe. Furthermore, allowing insurance coverage under these circumstances is not just bad law, it is bad public policy. In general, the Court holds that an insurance company would still be civilly liable for wrongful death when its under-aged insured criminally murders another. • In specific, the Court’s ruling, without any support in the record or in the plain meaning of the insurance policy, concludes that the policy’s penal law exclusion, which does not define penal law, “can arguably be read as references only an adult’s violation of a criminal statute, and not conduct by a juvenile that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime.” Ante, 183 N.J. at 352, 873 A.2d at 539. The plain statement of that conclusion belies its illogic, a result underscored by the facts underlying our recent denial of certification to a criminal defendant convicted of firing a BB gun into his backyard bushes for the purpose of scaring away teenage pranksters on Mischief Night 1 and striking one of the teenagers in the leg, causing no injury greater than a small bruise. State v. Mott, 183 N.J. 257 , 872 A.2d 798 (2005). 2 That criminal defendant was sentenced to five years imprisonment for the second-degree offense of possession of a firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of another, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a), with a three year parole disqualifier under the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). An orderly system of justice cannot, on the basis of the accidental characteristic of age alone, penalize an adult with five years imprisonment for firing a BB gun intending to scare away harassers that results in a slight bruise to a trespasser and, at the same time, provide insurance coverage to a juvenile who *361 fired a BB gun intending to hit his target (passing cars driving in a snow storm occupied by drivers and, perhaps, passengers, who had done nothing to provoke an assault) and rendered an innocent driver blind in one eye.
Because, in addition to the endangerment or harm exclusion, I would also deny coverage based on the exclusion for acts violative of the penal laws of this State, I respectfully dissent.
Justice LaVECCHIA joins in this opinion.
For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LONG and ZAZZALI — 3.
For reversal — Justices LaVECCHIA, WALLACE and RIVERA-SOTO — 3.
October 30th, the night before Halloween.
State v. Mott is cited solely to highlight its factual underpinnings and not for its jurisprudential effect; a denial of certification has neither substantive significance, Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 470 , 696 A.2d 633 (Stein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), nor precedential effect. R. 1:36-3; State v. Burgess, 298 N.J.Super. 254 , 285 n.1, 689 A.2d 730 (App.Div.1997) (Humphreys, J.A.D., dissenting).