concluding that claimant’s seeking a quitclaim deed for the disputed property from the rightful owners prior to the running of the statute of limitations for adverse possession defeated continuous hostility requirement
How later courts described this case
- concluding that claimant’s seeking a quitclaim deed for the disputed property from the rightful owners prior to the running of the statute of limitations for adverse possession defeated continuous hostility requirement
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SAYLOR, Justice,
dissenting.
There is ample evidence of record to establish the element of hostility required to support a claim of adverse possession. The trial court found that Appellants “intentionally possessed the property as against the record owners.” See Vlachos v. Witherow, 383 Pa. 174, 176 , 118 A.2d 174, 177 (1955) (finding that hostility does not denote ill will, but rather the intent to *674 hold title to property against the record title holder). This explicit finding of hostile possession is supported by evidence that Appellants: believed, upon purchase of their farm, that the disputed property was part of their lands; asserted continuous and exclusive dominion over the property; visibly excavated and cleared the property; constructed and removed fencing; and continuously mowed and maintained the property in a manner appropriate to its character.
I differ, most respectfully, with the majority’s holding that Appellants’ request for a quitclaim deed served to destroy the requisite hostility. This is so, the majority reasons, because such action constituted an acknowledgment of the superiority of the record owners’ title. While an offer to acquire legal title may constitute recognition of superior right in another and support the inference that use of the property is by permission, see Pistner Bros. v. Agheli, 359 Pa.Super. 177 , 518 A.2d 838 (1986), an attempt to secure a quitclaim deed does not, in my view, support a similar inference.
By statute, a quitclaim deed does not convey or warrant record title but, rather, constitutes only a release by the grantor of his or her interest, if any, in the property in question. 21 P.S. § 7; see generally Greek Catholic Congregation v. Plummer, 338 Pa. 373 , 12 A.2d 435 (1940); LADNER ON CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA 9.02 (rev. 4th ed.1979). Indeed, the device is most useful for the very reason that it permits parties to settle a property dispute without the necessity of an acknowledgment by either as to the merit of the other’s claim.
Thus, Appellants’ request for a quitclaim deed did not constitute an acknowledgment that Appellees’ predecessor in title possessed superior title, or any title at all, to the property in question.
CASTILLE and NIGRO, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.