The opinion
DANA, Justice,
with whom CLIFFORD and SAUFLEY, Justices, join,
dissenting.
[¶ 12] I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the plain language of 24 C.F.R. § 100.202 (c)(2) does not support the Court’s conclusion that the regulation allows a landlord to inquire whether an applicant has a handicap, but does not permit a landlord to ask for a brief description of the handicap. Because I believe the request for information by Cotton Mill does not run afoul of the type of inquiry expressly permitted pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 100.202 (c)(2), I would vacate the judgment.
[¶ 13] Section 100.202(c)(2) permits a landlord to make otherwise unlawful inquiries regarding a person’s handicap “to determine whether an applicant is qualified for a dwelling available only to persons with handi-caps_” The regulation clearly contemplates that a landlord who provides federally subsidized housing for handicapped persons will need to make a determination whether an applicant is in fact handicapped as defined by the Federal Fair Housing Act. The Act provides in pertinent part:
“Handicap” means, with respect to a person—
(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life activities,
(2) a record of having such impairment, or
(3) being regarded as having such an impairment....
42 U.S.C. § 3602 (h) (1994). The Court’s restrictive reading of section 100.202(c)(2) effectively allows the determination of whether an applicant is qualified for housing to be made by a physician of the applicant’s choosing, rather than by the owner of the housing, as anticipated by the regulation.
[¶ 14] The appropriate inquiry, as contemplated by the regulations and as requested by Cotton Mill, does no more than require an individual seeking to take advantage of federally subsidized housing to make more than a eonclusory showing that he qualifies for such assistance. Cotton Mill did not require an applicant to provide an extended medical history or copies of medical records *956 to substantiate a request for housing. It merely asked for a “brief description” of the applicant’s handicap to enable it to make the necessary determination of whether the applicant’s impairment “substantially limits one or more of such person’s life activities.” Because I believe a fair reading of section 100.202(c)(2) makes such a limited inquiry permissible, and because such an inquiry does not unreasonably intrude on an applicant’s right to privacy, I would vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.