holding an amendment to the Punitive Damages Act, N.J.S.A 2A:15-5.14, requiring award of compensatory damages as predicate for punitive damages award, was a "valid legislative attempt to curtail suits seeking redress for allegedly malicious conduct that causes no substantial injury"
How later courts described this case
- holding an amendment to the Punitive Damages Act, N.J.S.A 2A:15-5.14, requiring award of compensatory damages as predicate for punitive damages award, was a "valid legislative attempt to curtail suits seeking redress for allegedly malicious conduct that causes no substantial injury"
- holding that “an award of compensatory damages [i]s a predicate for a punitive damages award”
- explaining that punitive damages are warranted where the defendant's conduct constituted "intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an 'evil-minded act’ or an act accompanied by a wanton and wilful disregard of the rights of another”
- stating that "[a] jury's punitive damage award should be overturned as excessive only in clear cases"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GARIBALDI, J.,
concurring.
I agree that plaintiff established a valid claim for punitive damages under the Survivor’s Act, N.J.S.A 2AA5-3 for the tragic accident that occurred in 1990. As the Court observed, effective October 27, 1995, the Legislature enacted the Punitive Damages Act (the “Act”), N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.9 to -5.17. The Legislature’s purpose in enacting the Act was to establish more restrictive standards with regard to the awarding of punitive damages. See N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.9; Assembly Insurance Committee Statement, Senate, No. 1496-L. 1995, c. 142 (stating the restrictions imposed on the awarding of punitive damages). For example, that Act requires an award of compensatory damages as a statutory precedent for an award of punitive damages and disallows nominal damages as a basis for a punitive damages claim. N.J.S.A 2A:15-5.13(b) and (c).
The Court properly recognized that the Act did not govern the disposition of this appeal, as it did not take effect until October 27, 1995. The parties, also recognizing that the Act was not applicable, did not argue or brief whether the Act would be applicable in future matters where circumstances were as egregious as those presented in this appeal. Nevertheless, the Court reached out for that issue and concluded that the Legislature did not intend to foreclose punitive damages as a remedy for death caused by egregious conduct.
I would not have reached that issue. I recognize that the Court’s holding in that regard is dicta. Nevertheless, such an important decision should not be made unless the issue is before the Court, and is fully argued and briefed. That is particularly *248 true when the Court’s interpretation appears to be contrary to the clear legislative mandate indicating that the purpose of the Act was to restrict punitive damages, rather than expand them.
Justice GARIBALDI concurs in result.
For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN — 7.
Opposed — None.